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1 INTRODUCTION:  
SIDE EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS 
Have you ever bid too much on eBay? The initial idea for the present 
research came from the area of online auctions, where used books sometimes 
are auctioned for a higher price than identical new ones. This dysfunctional 
bidding behavior might result from plans to get a certain product being 
automatically implemented, along with the consequent failure to disengage from 
the ineffective behavior. If this automaticity also applies to somewhat similar 
situations, potential negative side effects of plans should be the consequence 
(e.g., changed consuming behavior in a store). The aim of the current research 
is to examine these potential side effects of plans. 
 
The automaticity resulting from plans has been addressed in research 
on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993; see section 3 for a detailed 
definition of implementation intentions). Implementation intentions are specific 
plans in the form “If situation X arises, I will initiate behavior Y” that have been 
suggested to improve goal attainment. It has been argued that by one 
intentional act of will, implementation intentions might lead to an improved 
detection of the specified situation and the automatic initiation of concrete goal-
directed behaviors as soon as the specified situation arises. Thus, they are a 
metacognitive self-regulatory tool at the interface of automatic and controlled 
processes that helps to overcome problems in relation to the successful 
implementation of goals (e.g., getting started, not missing good opportunities to 
act). To date, their effectiveness has been supported in an impressive range of 
samples and measures from highly controlled experiments on perceptual and 
behavioral consequences and processes to real world issues in the domains of 
health, work, environment, and intergroup relations (for an overview, see 
1 Introduction: Side effects of implementation intentions   9 
 
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005). Beside 
their effectiveness, potential costs of implementation intentions have been 
discussed. First, their automaticity was doubted, but was then convincingly 
demonstrated in various studies (e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis & Midden, 1999; 
Brandstätter, Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001). Second, negative consequences 
of this automaticity of implementation intentions were expected in terms of 
potential inaccuracy of the perception of internal or external conditions and of 
potential rigidity that should follow from their automaticity. Whereas it has been 
shown that implementation intentions do not have costs in terms of inaccuracy 
(Webb & Sheeran, 2004) the potential rigidity has not been systematically 
examined. It was discussed that rigidity as a result of implementation intentions 
might occur in form of people sticking to the situations and behavior specified in 
an implementation intention and thus fail to take advantage of unanticipated 
good opportunities for actions (Brandstätter et al., 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; 
Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). But such a reduced openness to suitable 
alternatives was argued to not be critical because people can always give up 
their commitment to the respective superordinate goal intention or 
implementation intention. In addition, people are also supposed to be able to 
use the cognitive capacities that become available through the automaticity of 
implementation intentions to recognize alternatives (Gollwitzer, 1999). Thus, 
rigidity as a result of implementation intentions is to be expected only when the 
specified situation is actually encountered. This type of rigidity is assumed to be 
functional, because it protects an ongoing goal pursuit from intrusions 
(Gollwitzer, 1999). 
 
However, to date no research has examined the possibility that this 
rigidity of implementation intentions when the specified situation is actually 
encountered could interfere with the pursuit of other goals that are actively held. 
Thus, the question is, whether the presence of the specified situation during the 
pursuit of other goals (i.e., actions) leads to unintended side effects of 
1 Introduction: Side effects of implementation intentions   10 
 
implementation intentions. Hence, the aim of the present research is to 
examine these potential side effects. More specifically, two main research 
questions will be investigated: 
 
- Do situational cues of implementation intentions attract attention even 
during the pursuit of another goal and thereby bias attention in an automatic 
fashion? 
- Do behaviors specified in implementation intentions generalize to situations 
where the situational cue of an implementation intention is present but 
another goal is pursued and thereby bias behavior in an automatic fashion? 
 
The first research question aims to inspect attentional side effects of 
implementation intentions that are caused by the situational part of the 
implementation intention. The second research question extends these 
attentional side effects to behavioral side effects of implementation intentions 
that are caused by the situational part of the implementation intention in 
combination with the behavioral part.
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2 GOALS AND INTENTIONS
Intentions have been used within different research traditions. Thus, the 
selected theories that will be presented in this section do not follow a stringent 
timely sequence. Instead, the selected theories will be introduced according to 
their main focus concerning different stages of goal pursuit. This procedure 
allows differentiating the different definitions of intentions and their role during 
goal pursuit. In motivational theories, intentions are important as behavioral 
proxies that amongst other influences (see 2.1) result from processes of goal 
setting (i.e., when an intention is defined), whereas in volitional theories, 
intentions are important as starting point of goal striving processes (i.e., how an 
intention is turned in action). Thus, intentions are central for theorizing on goal 
setting processes (e.g., theory of planned behavior, Ajzen, 1991) as well as 
goal striving processes (e.g., linkage theory of intentions, Ach, 1935). In the 
following, motivational theories on intentions in relation to goal setting as well 
as two early volitional theories of intentions in relation to goal striving are 
discussed (intentions as links, Ach, 1935; intentions as quasi-needs, Lewin, 
1951). Next, a more recent integrative intention theory is presented (intentions 
as transitions between action phases, Heckhausen, 1991; Gollwitzer, 1990) that 
serves as main theoretical framework for the present research. Finally, the role 
of intentions in contemporary research on self-regulation (e.g., self-regulation 
theories, Carver & Scheier, 1998; Kruglanski et al., 2002) and the converging 
methods from research on cognition as well as motivation are discussed that 
provide the theoretical background for most of the methods that are used in the 
present thesis. 
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2.1 Intentions in motivational theories 
During the last decades, intentions have mostly been operationalized as 
behavioral proxies in motivational theories on the relation between attitudes and 
behavior. Representative of these expectancy-value models is the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and its extension to the theory of 
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Within these theories, attitudes are assumed to 
be evaluations of actions, whereas intentions should indicate a person’s 
willingness to act and thus have been proposed as the proximal cause to 
behavior. A formed intention depends on the attitude towards a critical behavior 
(i.e., the expected value), the experienced normative pressure to execute it 
(i.e., subjective norm) and the self-efficacy (i.e., perceived control over the 
behavior; Bandura, 1986).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theory of planned behavior, Ajzen (1991). 
The higher the expected value and the perceived control (i.e., self-
efficacy), and the more favorable the norm is perceived (i.e., subjective norm), 
the higher should be the likelihood that an intention is formed and a certain 
behavior is shown. Thus, the intention construct following the theory of planned 
behavior summarizes a person’s motivational orientation towards an act or 
behavioral goal. Ajzen (1991, p.181) stated that “Intentions are assumed to 
capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior, they are indicators of 
how hard people are willing to try, of how much effort they are planning to exert, 
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in order to perform the behavior”. Underlining their usefulness, in a recent meta-
analysis (Sheeran, 2002), intentions have been demonstrated to explain 28 % 
of the behavioral variance. The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) 
recognizes that the intentions people form differ in terms of the abstractness of 
the desired goal. Intentions that specify concrete goals predict behavior better 
than intentions that specify abstract goals. But the theory of planned behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991) does not include the possibility that people specify when, where 
and how to act to implement their goals (i.e., form implementation intentions; 
see section 3 for a detailed definition of implementation intentions). Thus, the 
one-directionality of the intention formation as it is used in the theory of planned 
behavior (i.e., only when the result of the three preconditions are positive) was 
criticized because it does not speak to the possibility that people form 
intentions, when they anticipate difficulties during the execution of intended 
behaviors and that intentions themselves can promote the implementation of an 
intention (Gollwitzer, 1993). 
2.2 Intentions in volitional theories 
A linkage theory of intentions  
Intentions have been the subject of psychological theorizing before they 
were included in theories on the attitude-behavior relation. The Würzburg 
school of thought first examined the concept of intentions in terms of 
psychological theorizing. Within “will psychology” (Ach, 1905, 1910, for a 
summary, see Ach 1935) Narziß Ach introduced a linkage theory of intention 
with the concept of determination that aimed to predict how an intention is 
transferred into a reliable execution of the intended action. Thus, whereas 
theories on the attitude-behavior relation operationalized intentions only as an 
outcome of certain preconditions (i.e., as dependent variable or endpoint of the 
motivational phase), the linkage theory of intentions defined intentions as a 
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starting point of volitional processes (i.e., as independent variable). This 
approach allowed a closer inspection of the processes related to goal striving. 
Even then, Ach (1910, 1935) speculated that determination might work outside 
of people’s awareness. That is, when the specified situation is encountered, the 
associated behaviors are initiated without conscious intent to get started. With 
regard to underlying processes he speculated that the specified situation biases 
the perceptual and attentional processes in the direction of the intention. In 
addition, he suggested the concreteness of the situations as well as of the 
behaviors as moderators. Whereas Ach’s theorizing was functional to analyze 
concrete intentions (e.g., to send off a letter) it is less clear on higher order goal 
intentions (e.g., to have children) because he did not reflect on the interrelation 
between goal intentions and implementation intentions. 
A quasi-needs theory of intentions 
Later, Lewin (1926, 1951) suggested an intentions as needs approach. 
He assumed that intentions assign valence to objects and events (i.e., 
situations) in people’s environment (in German “Aufforderungscharakter”), in a 
similar way to needs and that these quasi-needs lead to action initiation. This 
intensity of the tension associated with the quasi-need, their relation to 
superordinate drives and general life goals, should moderate the amount of 
effort to execute the intention-related behaviors. Thus, Lewin addressed the 
interrelation of goal intentions (i.e., decisions whether or not to pursue a goal in 
the form “I intend to achieve goal X”, see section 2.3 for a detailed definition of 
goal intentions) and the intentions as described by Ach. He assumed that the 
Ach-type intentions depend on the strength of the higher order goal intention. 
Only when goal intentions are strong, should they effectively promote goal 
pursuit. In his research, he did not examine specific behaviors that are 
associated with the quasi-needs, but he assumed that any behavior that 
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reduces the tension should be appropriate. Thus, whereas Ach’s theorizing 
included assumptions about mediation processes (the link between situation 
and behavior), Lewin described moderators of the intention-action relation (i.e., 
the strength of the underlying goal, the activation of the objects or events).  
2.3 The integrative Rubicon model of action phases 
To allow a closer inspection of intentions and to integrate processes of 
goal setting as well as of goal striving modern theorizing build upon Ach’s and 
Lewin’s ideas. The questions of when intentions are most effective, how they 
achieve their effectiveness and when they are formed are addressed in the 
Rubicon model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1987; 1991; 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). The model assumes that individual’s cannot 
pursue all their wishes and desires and thus are forced to make a choice, which 
is preceded by deliberating the feasibility and desirability of the respective 
wishes. The higher the perceived feasibility and desirability of the respective 
wishes, the higher is the likelihood that the wishes are turned into binding goals, 
a person feels committed to. The enactment of relevant goal-directed behaviors 
depends not only on the feasibility and the desirability of the goal but also on 
the perceived suitability of the situational context and the feasibility and 
desirability of other goals. Whereas the Rubicon model of action phases is 
similar to traditional motivational theorizing in relation to goal choice (i.e., goal 
setting, see for example, theory of planned behavior, Ajzen, 1991) it also takes 
into account problems (i.e., variables) in relation to the implementation of a 
chosen goal (i.e., problems in relation to goal striving processes). Thus, 
differences between the motivational issue of goal choice (goal setting) and the 
volitional (willful) pursuit of goal implementation can be examined in more detail 
than in traditional theories. 
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Figure 2: The Rubicon model of action phases, Heckhausen (1991). 
Central to the model is the comprehensive temporal view of goal pursuit 
from a person’s wishes and desires to the evaluation of attained outcomes. The 
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desires. After the actual decision, effective planning takes place in the 
subsequent postdecisional (also preactional) phase. The following actional 
phase deals with the initiation of the relevant actions and with focusing on the 
effective attainment of the desired outcomes. After the attainment of these 
outcomes a postactional evaluative phase should follow where an individual 
tries to find out whether further attempts are worthwhile or necessary in order to 
realize the respective wish. 
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performance of a behavior (the behavioral intention) is predicted by the 
person’s attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. On the 
transition from the preactional phase to the subsequent actional phase, a 
second type of intention becomes important. To promote goal attainment via 
effective planning implementation intentions (e.g., “If I come home from work, I 
will go running for 40 minutes”; for a detailed definition, see section 3) can be 
formed by individuals. They might help overcoming problems associated with 
the initiation of the respective planned behavior that might occur during the 
implementation of the planned behavior (e.g., missing good opportunities to act, 
getting started). Taken together, within the Rubicon model of action phases, 
goal intentions are proposed to be especially important in the predecisional 
phase as they mark the transition point (i.e., the so called “Rubicon”) to the next 
phase. Implementation intentions are especially important in the preactional 
phase to overcome potential obstacles that might be met during goal pursuit.  
 
The Rubicon model of action phases also stimulated the theoretical 
concept of mind-sets. Mind-sets refer to general cognitive orientations with 
distinct features (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & 
Steller, 1990). That is, involvement in a task that is relevant to a specific action 
phase should activate relevant cognitive procedures that should facilitate the 
respective task and are thus beneficial to task completion. In the predecisional 
phase, a deliberative mind-set (induced by deliberating about desires and 
wishes) has been demonstrated (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) that leads to 
more open-mindedness in processing available information as a result of the 
cognitive orientation. In the preactional phase an implementational mind-set 
has been demonstrated that leads to certain closed-mindedness with regard to 
irrelevant information (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). Thus, it should help to 
overcome problems related to the goal implementation (e.g., being distracted 
by other goals, pessimistic about the feasibility of the specified goal, doubting 
the desirability of the respective goal). An impressive body of research supports 
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these assumptions (e.g., Bayer & Gollwitzer, 2005; Brandstätter & Frank, 2002; 
Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). It is especially 
noteworthy that the concept of mind-sets was one of the first that bridged the 
gap between motivational and cognitive research and demonstrated a 
systematic relation between motivation (i.e., motivational orientations: 
predecisional phase, preactional phase) and cognition (i.e., cognitive 
processing modes: deliberative vs. implementational mind-set). 
 
Taken together, the Rubicon model of action phases inspired research 
on goal intentions, implementation intentions and mind-sets. As the current 
work focuses on implementation intentions and also relates to goal intentions, 
the Rubicon model of action phases has been chosen as most suitable 
theoretical framework. Within the pursuit of a goal (i.e., action phase) it pictures 
the relation between goal intentions and implementation intentions and allows 
to make predictions, when intentions are formed and when they are most 
effective. But to address the processes by which potential costs of the 
automaticity of implementation intentions come about, the structural and 
representational perspective of recent research on motivational processes has 
to be taken into account in addition to the Rubicon model of action phases. This 
perspective is important for the examination of the research questions of the 
present thesis as most of the methods refer to it. Thus, before the concept of 
implementation intentions will be examined more closely in section 3, a short 
summary of this perspective follows. 
 
Recent theories on self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002) have led to impressive advances in research on goal 
striving because they model processes underlying goal pursuit instead of 
focusing on the effects of different goal contents on goal striving (e.g., Locke & 
Latham, 1990; Bandura & Schunk, 1981). Specifically, they address volitional 
(willful) processes in relation to goal striving but not motivational processes 
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(e.g., the choice of specific goals) in relation to goal setting. Thus, self-
regulation theories are similar to theorizing on implementation intentions 
concerned with implementational problems related to the when, where, and 
how of goal pursuit.  
 
Self-regulation theories as well as goal theories refer to internal 
subjective goals (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001) and hence goal-directed 
behavior is defined as behavior in relation to subjective goals that a person 
feels committed to (e.g., the goal to be fair in negotiations would be the 
reference point for the analysis of effort or behavior that has to be shown to 
achieve this goal). Deviating from previous theories, self-regulation theories 
work with a new operational definition of goals. Goals are defined as mental 
representations of desired end-states that initiate and guide behavior (e.g., 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). This definition follows a motivation-as-cognition instead 
of a motivation-vs.-cognition paradigm that allows transferring the knowledge of 
representations and cognition to the study of goals. For example, when treating 
goals as representations, their connections to contexts, actions, and other goals 
can be treated similar to those of other types of representations. Thus, this 
definition of a goal can lead to a better understanding of how goals are 
activated, how they activate the actions used to satisfy them, and how to 
strengthen or inhibit the activation of other representations (e.g., other goals, 
means). Similarly to goals, the methods of the motivation-as-cognition paradigm 
have also been successfully applied to the concepts of goal intentions and 
implementation intentions (e.g., Malzacher, 1992; Aarts et al., 1999; Gollwitzer, 
Trötschel, & Sumner, 2002, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005). For example, Aarts 
et al. (1999) used a measure of the accessibility of the mental representation of 
specific cues in their research on implementation intentions. In a lexical 
decision task, words decisions were faster for words contained in an 
implementation intention compared to neutral words. This heightened 
accessibility of implementation intention cues was demonstrated to mediate the 
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effects of the formation of an implementation intention on goal attainment (i.e., 
picking up a food coupon). Thus, research on goal intentions and 
implementation intentions benefits from the process-orientation of research on 
self-regulation and the converging methods in the research fields of cognition 
and motivation. Mental operations known from research on cognitive processes 
can most likely also be applied to the analyses of motivational processes. 
2.4 Summary goals and intentions 
Taken together, intentions can not only be seen as the product of the 
motivational phase of goal setting (e.g., theory of planned behavior, Ajzen, 
1991), but also as a starting point for the volitional phase in the pursuit of 
behavioral goals that includes all processes related to goal striving (e.g., 
intentions as links, Ach, 1935; or quasi-needs, Lewin, 1951). As an integrative 
theory of intentions that comprises processes of goal setting as well as of goal 
striving, the Rubicon model of action phases (Heckhausen, 1991) qualifies as 
the most suitable model for the investigation of side effects of implementation 
intentions. Beside this approach, intentions are an important construct in the 
context of self-regulation theories of goal striving, and also benefited from 
advances of this research with regard to the process orientation and the 
methods (i.e., goals and intentions as mental representations; convergence of 
motivational and cognitive research methods) of this structural and 
representational perspective that will be used to examine the research 
questions of the present thesis. 
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3 IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS
The next section aims to elaborate on the concept of implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999), to give an overview of available evidence of 
their benefits and costs, to consider the processes underlying their effects, to 
examine potential side effects of implementation intentions, and to present an 
overview of the present research. 
3.1 The concept of implementation intentions 
Implementation intentions are a concept that, like the goal intention and 
the mind-set concept, were stimulated by the Rubicon model of action phases 
(Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen, 1987; 1991; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; 
see section 2.4). They are defined as a special form of planning that 
necessitates the commitment of an individual to a specific goal-directed 
behavior in response to specific situations (Gollwitzer, 1999). The formation of 
an implementation intention just needs the specification of a situation and a 
behavior when, where and how a person plans to pursue a certain goal in the 
form “If situation X arises, I will perform behavior Y”. Thus, they link an 
anticipated future situation (situation X) with a specific goal-directed behavior 
(behavior Y). As a consequence, the initiation of the specified actions is 
assumed to carry features of automaticity (Gollwitzer, 1999, Gollwitzer & 
Schaal, 1998). That is, it should be swift, efficient, and not require conscious 
intent (e.g., Bargh, 1994; Logan, 1988, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; 
Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
 
Functionally, implementation intentions are subordinate to goal 
intentions (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). Goal intentions specify a 
desired end-state, which may be the execution of a concrete behavior or the 
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attainment of a desired outcome in the form “I intend to achieve goal Z.” They 
commit a person to achieving the specified desired end-state, but not to the 
execution of a specific behavior in response to a specific situation. Whereas 
goal intentions mark the transition from the predecisional to the preactional 
phase in the Rubicon model of action phases (similar to the intentions specified 
in the theory of planned behavior, Ajzen, 1991), implementation intentions mark 
the transition from the preactional to the actional phase. That is, they delegate 
the initiation of the specified behavior (Y) to the specified situation (X) and thus 
to environmental cues. 
 
Implementation intentions have been suggested to be particularly 
effective, when problems related to the initiation of a goal pursuit are 
anticipated. That is, if for example goal intentions can be enacted in a variety of 
different ways, or the time and location of their pursuit are uncertain. Under 
such conditions, they should be unlikely to be enacted, because good 
opportunities for action are likely to be missed (e.g., Orbell & Sheeran, 2000). 
To overcome such problems in relation to the regulation of goal striving 
processes (i.e., self-regulatory problems), implementation intentions can be 
formed. 
3.2 Benefits of implementation intentions 
The concept of implementation intentions has been applied across a 
range of samples and measures of behavior. In a meta-analysis of 15 studies 
on the impact of implementation intentions on goal attainment (Sheeran, 2002) 
they were shown to have a medium sized effect, d = .70. Beneficial effects of 
implementation intentions on goal attainment were found for behaviors that 
people intend to enact as well as for behaviors people intend to inhibit. 
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An area where implementation intentions have repeatedly been applied 
is health-promotion and disease-prevention. Participants who formed 
implementation intentions were more likely to attend cervical cancer screenings 
(Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), take vitamin supplements (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999), 
perform breast self-examination (Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997), eat 
healthily (Verplanken & Faes, 1999), exercise (Milne, Orbell, & Sheeran, 2002), 
and resist alcohol consumption (Murgraff, White, & Philipps, 1996). 
 
Furthermore, implementation intentions were found to help people to be 
fair in negotiations (Trötschel & Gollwitzer, in press), to behave environmentally 
friendly (Bamberg, 2000), to memorize intentions (Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 
2001), to stay focused, even among opiate addicts, schizophrenic patients as 
well as under cognitive load (Brandstätter et al., 2001). They also improved 
attitudes towards new products and their use (Kardes, Cronley, & Posavac, 
2005), helped to overcome unrealistic planning (i.e., planning fallacy; Koole & 
Van’t Spijker, 2000), to overcome mundane behaviors (Aarts et al., 1999), and 
to write job applications more continuously (for an overview, see Gollwitzer et 
al., 2005; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). 
 
To promote goal attainment in relation to unwanted behaviors, three 
different forms of implementation intentions have been suggested. They can be 
directed at the facilitation of tasks (“If situation X arises, then I will perform 
behavior Y”), but can also aim to suppress unwanted responses (“If situation X 
arises, then I will not perform behavior Y”), or to ignore the specified situation 
(“If situation X arises, then I will ignore it!”), (see Gollwitzer et al., 2005). 
Although most positive effects of implementation intentions were demonstrated 
using task facilitative implementation intentions, there is initial evidence that 
especially behavior suppression implementation intentions are effective in 
suppressing habitual stereotypical and prejudicial responses (Achtziger, 2002; 
Gollwitzer, Achtziger, Schaal, & Hammelbeck, 2002, both cited in Gollwitzer et 
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al., 2005), and in blocking detrimental self-states (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 2000, 
cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Webb & Sheeran, 2003, Study 2). In line with 
most of the implementation intention research (Gollwitzer et al., 2005; 
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006), the present research used task facilitative 
implementation intentions as they most plausibly represent the implementation 
intentions people naturally form. Thereby, they contribute to the external validity 
of the present research. 
In sum, these studies provide overwhelming evidence that 
implementation intentions improve the attainment of goal intentions that are 
easy to forget (e.g., regular intake of vitamin pills, Sheeran & Orbell, 1999), not 
easily attained (e.g., writing a report about Christmas Eve during the holidays, 
Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997), or somehow unpleasant (e.g., engaging in 
physical activity, Milne et al., 2002). Furthermore, implementation intentions 
improve not only the attainment of goals that need so called “one-shot” (i.e., 
singular) behaviors (e.g., pick up a food coupon, Aarts et al., 1999) but also of 
goals that demand repeated behaviors (e.g., regular breast self examinations, 
Orbell et al., 1997).  
3.2.1 Moderators of implementation intention effects 
Five potential moderators of these effects have been revealed by 
previous research. First, the difficulty of the initiation of the goal-directed 
behavior was found to moderate the implementation intention effects on goal 
attainment. Implementation intentions were effective in promoting the 
completion of goals that were difficult to implement but not of goals that were 
easy to implement (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997, Study 1).  
 
Second, the strength of the commitment to the respective goal intention 
moderated the implementation intention effects on goal attainment (Orbell et al., 
1997). Implementation intentions only improved the frequency of breast self-
examinations in women who strongly intended to perform the breast self-
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examination but not in women who held weak goal intentions to perform the 
breast self-examination. Similarly, implementation intentions only improved the 
number of hours of independent study, when participants held a strong goal 
intention but not when they held a weak goal intention to study (Sheeran et al., 
2005).  
 
Third, the activation of the superordinate goal intention was found to 
moderate the effects on goal attainment. Sheeran et al. (2005, Study 2) 
provided evidence that implementation intentions are sensitive to the activation 
of the respective superordinate goal intention. Implementation intentions to 
speed up responses only had their desired effect in a lexical decision task when 
the speed goal but not when an accuracy goal was activated. The results are 
especially noteworthy as the respective superordinate goal has been activated 
outside of participants’ awareness. This moderation of the implementation 
intention effects is also referred to as goal-dependent automaticity (see also 
section 3.2.3). 
 
Fourth, the strength of the commitment to the respective implementation 
intention also influences their effects on goal attainment (Gollwitzer, Bayer, 
Steller, & Bargh, 2002, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Implementation 
intentions promoted goal attainment, when participants were told that they 
benefit from rigidly adhering to their plan but not when they were told that they 
would benefit from staying flexible (Seehausen, Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 1994, cited 
in Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998).  
 
Finally, the strength of the mental link between the if-part (situation X) 
and the then-part (behavior Y) of an implementation intention has been 
suggested as a moderator of implementation intention effects (Gollwitzer et al., 
2005). The more time and concentration a person takes to encode the specific 
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if-then plan, the stronger the link between the situation-behavior should be, and 
the stronger the implementation intention effect(s). 
 
In sum, implementation intentions promote goal pursuit more efficiently 
when they are directed at goals that are difficult to implement, a strong 
commitment towards the goal intentions as well as the implementation 
intentions is given, the respective superordinate goal intention is activated when 
the situation specified in the implementation intention is encountered, and a 
repeated and concentrated encoding of the implementation intention was 
conducted. 
3.2.2 Processes underlying implementation intention effects 
Why are implementation intentions effective? Gollwitzer and Schaal 
(1998) suggested that implementation intentions affect goal pursuit through the 
use of three mechanisms. First, implementation intentions lead to a heightened 
accessibility of the mental representation of the situational cue (X), which in turn 
facilitates the detection of the situational cue in the environment. There is 
strong evidence for this perceptual readiness effect (Aarts et al., 1999; 
Seehausen et al., 1994 and Steller, 1992 both cited in Gollwitzer & Schaal, 
1998; Webb & Sheeran, 2004). For example, in an experiment of Aarts et al. 
(1999) participants had the goal to pick-up their participant compensation close 
to a fire-hose in the hallway. Those who formed an implementation intention 
showed higher accessibility of the word fire-hose in a lexical decision task 
(compared to participants holding the same goal but no implementation 
intention).  
 
Second, Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) suggested that implementation 
intentions bias attentional processes (i.e., the situational cue (X) is assumed to 
attract attention, even during the pursuit of other goals). This implies that after 
forming an implementation intention, attention is attracted by good opportunities 
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to act, even when the person is focusing on an alternative goal. Thus, the 
attraction of attention can be seen as a precondition that good opportunities to 
act are not missed and the implementation intentions can enfold their effects. 
Unfortunately, almost no research has so far addressed the impact of 
implementation intentions on attention (for an exception and its limitations see 
the work summarized in section 4 by Steller, 1992 cited in Gollwitzer, 1993).  
 
Finally, the formation of an implementation intention links the situational 
cue (X) to the specified behavior (Y). This delegates the initiation of the 
behavior (Y) to the situational cue (X), (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). In other 
words, implementation intentions establish a situation-behavior link and in turn 
the situational cue (X) has a similar effect as primes in automatic behavior 
(Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Evidence for this behavioral readiness (i.e., 
automatic action initiation) was provided by various studies (Brandstätter et al., 
2001; Malzacher, 1992; Webb & Sheeran, 2004). 
 
Taken together, implementation intention effects on goal pursuit are 
mediated by perceptual (i.e., improved detection of situational cues of an 
implementation intention) as well as behavioral processes (i.e., the automatic 
initiation of a specified action in response to a specified situation as a 
consequence of a situation-behavior link). In addition, attentional processes 
have been suggested to be biased by implementation intentions (i.e., attraction 
of attention, even during the pursuit of other goals). 
3.3 Costs of implementation intentions 
3.3.1 Limitations of their effectiveness 
Besides evidence for the various benefits of implementation intentions 
also limitations of the effectiveness of implementation intentions have been 
observed by previous research. 
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Limitations of the effectiveness of implementation intentions have been 
found in their ability to overrule unwanted habits. Implementation intentions 
have important parallels to habits and are even described as instant habits 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Both operate relatively automatically and rely on cue-
response relations (Sheeran et al., 2005). In addition to several studies that 
found that implementation intentions are effective in overcoming unwanted 
habits (Aarts et al., 1999; Gollwitzer et al., 2002, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005), 
there is also evidence that implementation intentions do not overrule habitual 
behavior. For example, in a Study on eating habits, implementation intentions 
led those with unhealthy eating habits to eat healthier, but only in habit-
unrelated respects and thus did not break the negative influence of unhealthy 
eating habits (Verplanken & Faes, 1999). Also, implementation intentions did 
not reduce the amount of relapse errors in routinized decision making (Betsch, 
Haberstroh, Molter, & Glöckner, 2004). Although no consistent moderation of 
the implementation intention effects by habit strength has been found, habits 
seem to represent a limit of the effectiveness of implementation intentions. 
3.3.2 Reported unexpected costs  
Beside these limitations, implementation intentions have also been found 
to lead to costs in form of overmotivation effects. Here, a set of conditions has 
been identified where implementation intentions bias behavior in the opposite 
direction to that intended. In two studies on the effects of task-facilitating 
implementation intentions to work harder in the presence of distractions (Schaal 
& Gollwitzer, 1997, cited in Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) implementation 
intentions actually hampered performance. More specifically, task-facilitation 
goal intentions and implementation intentions that are formed on top of being 
highly motivated led to weaker performance in arithmetic tasks (selected from 
the concentration achievement test, Düker, 1953) compared to only task-
facilitation goal intentions without implementation intentions that were formed in 
addition to being highly motivated. As an explanation of these findings 
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overmotivation (Baumeister, 1984; Heckhausen & Strang, 1988) is discussed. 
That is, only when the task at hand is not too involving to begin with (e.g., 
unattractive, boring) should task-facilitative implementation intentions be 
beneficial to automatically increase effort. If the task at hand is involving, task-
facilitative implementation intentions become dysfunctional and should lead to 
an overmotivation that hampers task performance. This implementation 
intention induced bias in behavior should not be too harmful when people notice 
the dysfunctionality of their implementation intentions and disengage from 
them. But in fact, in the reported Study (Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1997, cited in 
Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) they did not. This was interpreted as showing that 
“implementation intentions produce a form of automaticity that is not easily 
escaped” (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998, p. 130). Thus, it should be rather unlikely 
that persons notice perceptual biases as well as behavioral biases of 
implementation intentions and adapt to optimize goal attainment dependent on 
the functionality or dysfunctionality of an implementation intention for successful 
goal attainment (see section 6.1 for a detailed discussion). 
3.3.3 Investigated costs of implementation intentions 
Besides the beneficial effects of implementation intentions and the 
reported unexpected costs, other potential costs for the pursuit of the respective 
superordinate goals were frequently discussed and have been addressed in 
several studies (Brandstätter et al., 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer et al., 
2005; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Sheeran et al., 2005). 
 
Overall, two sources of cost have been classified: First, the automaticity 
of implementation intentions was questioned and potential costs in terms of 
cognitive processing have been discussed. Second, consequences of their 
automaticity in terms of potential inaccuracy to internal or external conditions, or 
paradox effects, have been examined. 
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With respect to the “automaticity” of implementation intentions, it has 
been suggested that holding them actually leads to costs in terms of producing 
high degrees of ego-depletion. This argumentation follows from ego-depletion 
theory (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998) that assumes that any self-
regulatory strategy has costs with respect to a person’s general resource for 
self-regulation. Contrary, it was argued that implementation intention do not 
lead to ego-depletion because they delegate the control of the behavior to 
environmental cues and thus the self should not be implicated (Gollwitzer & 
Bayer, 2000, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Evidence 
for the hypothesis that implementation intentions do not lead to ego-depletion 
was provided by Webb and Sheeran (2003). They found that participants who 
formed an implementation intention for an exhaustive task (i.e., Stroop task) 
persisted longer in a subsequent unsolvable puzzles task compared to 
participants who did not form an implementation intention for the unrelated 
Stroop task. Similarly, Gollwitzer and Bayer (2000, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 
2005) demonstrated that furnishing the goal to control emotions with an 
implementation intention led to better performance in a difficult anagram task 
that followed a humorous movie compared to a condition in which participants 
only formed the goal to control emotions. Taken together, these results imply 
that holding implementation intentions does not lead to self-regulatory costs in 
terms of ego-depletion and supports the notion of the automaticity of 
implementation intentions. 
 
With respect to the potential costs in terms of cognitive processing, it has 
been doubted that implementation intentions lead to automatic action initiation. 
To demonstrate that implementation intentions do not have costs in terms of 
absorbing cognitive capacity during the initiation of an action (i.e., automatically 
initiate action) requires showing not only immediate action initiation under 
conditions of low mental load (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997) but also under 
increased mental load. To test the automaticity of the action initiation, dual-task 
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paradigms (Heuer, 1996; Gopher & Navon, 1980; Wickens, 1980) were used. In 
these paradigms, participants have to work on two tasks at the same time. The 
hypothesis in two studies of Brandstätter, Lengfelder and Gollwitzer (2001) was 
that if implementation intentions towards a secondary task would interact with 
cognitive load, costs in form of a diminished performance in the primary task 
would be the consequence if mental load was high. Results revealed that action 
initiation in a secondary task (i.e., a go/no-go task) led to the predicted 
immediate action initiation in terms of a speed up when cues specified in an 
implementation intention were present. Furthermore, this acceleration did not 
occur on the cost of responding quickly to noncritical cues in the secondary task 
and also not on the cost of participant’s performance in the primary task (i.e., 
memory test). Most importantly, these effects were independent of the difficulty 
of the primary task and thus confirmed that implementation intentions do not 
require much cognitive capacity but lead to an automatic initiation of the 
specified actions. This pattern of results was additionally replicated in the 
second study using the same input (visual perception) and output channel 
(motor response) in both tasks. Thus, there is good evidence that neither 
holding implementation intentions nor initiating the specified behavior requires 
much cognitive capacity and consequently implementation intentions hold 
features of automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1994; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
 
Beside doubts about the automaticity of implementation intentions, 
potential costs in terms of low flexibility resulting from their automaticity have 
been discussed. On the one hand, assuming that implementation intentions are 
independent of goal intentions, potential costs in form of rigid and inadequate 
behavior should be likely because implementation intentions would lead to 
automatic action initiation once the situation is encountered, even when a 
respective superordinate goal intention is not held. On the other hand, 
assuming that implementation intentions are dependent of goal intentions, they 
should only lead to automatic action initiation once the situation is encountered, 
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when a respective superordinate goal intention is actively held. Thus, potential 
costs in terms of rigid and inadequate behavior should become less likely if 
implementation intentions are dependent from the respective superordinate 
goal intentions. Actually, an increasing body of evidence supports the notion of 
the dependence of implementation intentions from goal intentions (Gollwitzer & 
Schaal, 1998; Sheeran et al., 2005). Thus, implementation intentions are 
assumed to qualify as a subcategory of goal-dependent automaticity (Gollwitzer 
& Schaal, 1998). In goal-dependent automaticity (Bargh, 1989, 1992), 
automatic behavior is shown in the pursuit of a set goal (e.g., hitting the brake 
in response to a red light, when the goal of driving a car to a final destination is 
held). Similarly, implementation intentions should automatically initiate a 
specified behavior (e.g., going running) in response to a specified situation 
(e.g., coming home from work), but only when the respective superordinate 
goal intention is held (e.g., becoming physically fit). The only differences 
between the two types of goal-dependent automaticity rest in the way they 
originate (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Whereas the goal-dependent automaticity 
results from the frequent and consistent pairing of situations and behaviors 
(Anderson, 1983, for a review, see Bargh, 1997), the strategic automaticity of 
implementation intentions is created by just a single act of will. Empirically, 
some evidence for an independence of implementation intentions from goal 
intentions was found (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak, 1990, Heckhausen 
& Beckmann, 1990; Steller, 1992, cited in Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998), but most 
recent studies reveal that implementation intentions are dependent on the 
strength and activation of the respective superordinate goal intention 
(Seehausen et al., 1994, cited in Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Sheeran et al., 
2005; see section 3.1.1). Hence, implementation intentions seem to depend on 
the respective superordinate goal intention and therefore potential costs in 
terms of inadequate and rigid behavior initiations when a goal intention is not 
actively held should be rather unlikely. 
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In addition, potential costs in terms of incorrect cue discrimination 
resulting from implementation intentions have been addressed by previous 
research (Webb & Sheeran, 2004). To address this question Webb and 
Sheeran conducted two studies (Webb & Sheeran, 2004, Study 2 and 3). They 
used a dual-task paradigm similar to the one of Brandstätter et al. (2001, 
described above). In addition to the specific situational cue of the 
implementation intention (i.e., the number 3) and non-critical cues (e.g., the 
numbers 9, 44, 555, 694), they included ambiguous cues (i.e., the numbers 33, 
333, 39, 413) in the task. Results indicated that implementation intentions led to 
the predicted speed up effects only in the responses to the exact 
implementation intention cue but not to costs in terms of an increase of false 
positive (Study 2) or slower responses to non-critical or ambiguous stimuli 
(Study 3). Hence, first evidence is available that implementation intentions do 
not lead to costs with regard to the accuracy of cue discrimination. 
 
Finally, implementation intentions have been suggested to produce costs 
in terms of rebound effects in mental control (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). That is, 
conscious attempts to control unwanted thoughts increase the accessibility of 
these unwanted thoughts and thus the likelihood that these unwanted behaviors 
surface in subsequent thoughts and behavior. In two studies rebound effects of 
implementation intentions were tested (Gollwitzer et al., 2002, cited in 
Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Participants who furnished their goal intention to 
suppress stereotypic thoughts about homeless people with an implementation 
intention used less stereotypic descriptions when writing a statement about 
their impression of homeless people. In addition, they showed less rebound in a 
subsequent semantic differential type questionnaire that contained five pairs in 
relation to the stereotype of homeless people (e.g., drunk – sober, busy- lazy) 
than participants who only held a goal intention. In a second study rebound was 
measured in a lexical decision task. Whereas participants who formed a goal 
intention to not stereotype were faster in identifying stereotypes as words as 
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compared to non-words in the lexical decision task, participants who furnished 
their goal with implementation intentions did not show such speed ups to 
stereotypic words. In sum, implementation intentions are suggested to shield a 
person’s conscious mental states from rebound effects because “the links 
between the critical situation and the response serves to isolate the plan from 
present internal states or external conditions, the plan runs off in an effortless, 
efficient manner, and does not tax cognitive resources (of the conscious 
operating system)”, (Gollwitzer et al., 2005, p. 509). 
 
In sum, limitations of implementation intentions were found in form of 
heterogeneous results on the effectiveness of implementation intentions in 
overcoming unwanted habits (i.e., overcoming unhealthy eating habits, 
routinized decision making) and costs were found in the form of biased 
behavior in easy tasks (i.e., hampered performance if they are formed for easy 
tasks) that were not noticed (i.e., participants did not disengage from ineffective 
implementation intentions). No costs of implementation intentions have been 
found in terms of depleting self-regulatory resources, inadequate action 
initiation when the respective superordinate goal intention is not actively held or 
when ambiguous cues are present during goal pursuit. Furthermore, no costs in 
terms of rebound effects in mental control have been found. Without doubt the 
reported limitations and costs do not outweigh the impressive evidence of the 
benefits of implementation intentions, but they underline the necessity to 
systematically examine potential side effects implementation intentions might 
have for goal pursuit. 
 
3.4 Side effects of implementation intentions 
Research on the costs of implementation intentions focused on the 
automaticity of implementation intentions and their consequences. Thereby, it 
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was demonstrated that implementation intentions lead to enhanced detection of 
situational cues and to automatic action initiation. These automatic effects have 
been argued not to lead to costs because two preconditions have to be fulfilled:  
 
First, the automaticity of implementation intentions results from a single 
act of will. That is, people intentionally define situations in which the automatic 
action initiation should help them to achieve their goals. This intentional 
causation of the automatic effects is referred to as strategic automaticity 
(Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) of implementation intentions. 
 
Second, implementation intentions are assumed to dependent on the 
actual state of the superordinate goal intention. That is, implementation 
intentions should enfold their automatic effects only when the superordinate 
goal is actively held. This specification of the automaticity of implementation 
intentions has been named as a subcategory of goal-dependent automaticity 
(Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Sheeran et al., 2005). 
 
The first precondition that the specified situational cues have to be 
present to elicit the automatic effects of implementation intentions is fully 
agreed by the present examination of potential costs as a side effect of 
implementation intentions. The main critic of the present thesis is directed at the 
second assumption that the goal-dependent automaticity of implementation 
intentions prevents potential side effects. Implicit in this argumentation and in 
previous research is the assumption that only one goal intention is actively held 
at a time and thus inadequate effects of implementation intentions are rather 
unlikely. But knowing that successful goal pursuit often requires that a goal is 
actively held over longer time periods and thus that often more than one goal is 
actively held (Kruglanski et al., 2002), the goal-dependent automaticity of 
implementation intentions should not be sufficient to prevent potential negative 
side effects. Consequently, if the superordinate goal intention of an 
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implementation intention is actively held, automatic effects of implementation 
intentions should be possible even during the pursuit of other goals. 
 
That is, as long as the superordinate goal intentions are actively held 
(e.g., being friendly to people), situational cues (e.g., a person) can be 
assumed to automatically attract attention and initiate the behavior specified in 
the implementation intention (e.g., starting to talk to a person), even if a other 
goal is actually pursued (e.g., concentrating on writing up a journal article). 
 
Unlike the intended effects of implementation intentions for the 
respective goal pursuit, automatic effects of implementation intentions during 
the pursuit of other goals would be unintended side effects of implementation 
intentions. Up to date, there has been no systematic theoretical exploration or 
empirical testing of the possibility that implementation intentions lead to side 
effects when the respective superordinate goal intention is actively held and 
their cues are present as additional cues during the pursuit of another goal. 
Therefore, it is the aim of the current research to examine if the presence of 
specified situational cues during the pursuit of another goal leads to costs of 
implementation intentions as an unintended side effect. Derived from previous 
research on the processes underlying the effects of implementation intentions 
(Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006), these negative side 
effects are expected in form of attentional consequences (resulting from the 
specified situation, see section 3.3.1, 4) as well as behavioral consequences 
(resulting from the specified behavior, see section 3.3.2, 5).  
3.4.1 Attentional side effects caused by situational cues 
Attentional processes have been assumed to be part of the processes 
that underlie the effects of implementation intentions (see section 3.1.2). That 
is, implementation intention cues should not escape people’s attention and thus 
good opportunities to act should not easily be missed. But knowing that 
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attention is a limited source (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Wickens, 1980), the 
automatic attraction of attention through implementation intentions is likely to 
lead to costs in terms of reduced attentional resources that are left to attend to 
other cues. Transferring this process to situations where an implementation 
intention as well as the respective superordinate goal intention is actively held, 
the presence of situational cues specified in this implementation intention 
should attract attention, even during the pursuit of other goals. Consequently, 
less attentional resources remain for the goal that is actually pursued and a 
diminished goal attainment should result. Therefore, the first aim of the present 
research is to examine if implementation intentions attract people’s attention, 
even during the pursuit of another goal and if this automatic attraction of 
attention results in diminished goal attainment as a side effect of 
implementation intentions. Attention attraction effects (i.e., disruption of the 
focal task by a situational cue from the implementation intention) would be 
evidenced by diminished performances in simultaneous measurement in 
contexts with more than one important task dimension (Study 1) and in 
sequential measurement in different tasks (Study 2 & 3). Additionally, a positive 
relation between attention attraction effects and improved performance effects 
of implementation intentions would be expected (Study 3). If more attentional 
attraction co-occurs with improved implementation intention performances in a 
separate task this would point to identical processes underlying benefits as well 
as costs of implementation intentions. 
3.4.2 Behavioral side effects caused by automatic action initiation 
Following Gollwitzer (1999, p. 501), “rigidity as a result of implementation 
intentions is to be expected, however, when the specified situation is actually 
encountered, but this type of rigidity is functional, because it protects an 
ongoing goal pursuit from intrusions”. Whereas this assumption of the 
functionality of the rigidity of implementation intentions (i.e., automatic action 
initiation) speaks to a constellation where the specified situation is present 
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during the pursuit of the respective goal, the previous theorizing is silent on 
potential side effects of this rigidity of implementation intentions, if the specified 
situation is present during the pursuit of other goals. Therefore, the second 
research goal of the present research was to test whether the automaticity of 
implementation intentions leads to behavioral side effects if parts of the 
situation specified in the implementation intention are present during the pursuit 
of another goal. These negative side effects would be evidenced by a 
generalization of behaviors that are specified in the implementation intention to 
behaviors directed at other goals, when the specified situational cues are 
present as additional cues during the pursuit of another goal. Such negative 
side effects of implementation intentions (i.e., biased behavior in a task when 
situational cues of an implementation intention that was formed for another goal 
are present) would be expected for judgments in social contexts. In these 
contexts, social comparisons have been demonstrated to moderate the 
direction of automatic behavior (e.g., Schubert & Häfner, 2003). Similarly, the 
automaticity of implementation intentions was expected to lead to 
overgeneralization of the behavior specified in the implementation intention in 
contexts where no social comparisons take place (Study 4). Judgments of a 
different social group should be endorsed in the direction of the behavior 
specified in a group-directed implementation intention (i.e., overgeneralization) 
when the situational cue is present. In contexts where social comparisons take 
place (Study 5), contrasting behavior was expected. Judgments of a different 
social group should be endorsed in the opposite direction of the behavior 
specified in the implementation intention (i.e., contrast) when the situational cue 
is present.  
3.5 Overview of the present research 
Two series of studies were conducted to examine attentional and 
behavioral side effects of implementation intentions. In the first series, attention 
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attraction effects of implementation intentions have been examined during the 
pursuit of other goals. In three studies, situational cues of an implementation 
intention have been presented during the pursuit of other goals. The attraction 
of attention was indicated by a diminished performance on the performance 
dimension that was unrelated to the implementation intention (i.e., simultaneous 
measurement, Study 1) or by a diminished performance on a separate task 
(sequential measurement, Study 2, 3). 
 
In the second series of studies, behavioral side effects of implementation 
intentions were investigated in form of biased judgments of unrelated social 
groups. In two studies, situational cues of an unrelated implementation intention 
were present during the pursuit of other goals. The generalization of the 
behavior specified in the implementation intention during the pursuit of another 
goal was indicated by the endorsement of judgments of an unrelated social 
group in the direction of the behavior specified in the implementation intention 
as overgeneralization (Study 4) or in the opposite direction as contrast behavior 
(Study 5).
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4 IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS AND ATTENTIONAL 
SIDE EFFECTS1 
4.1 Attentional effects of implementation intentions 
How could it be shown that situational cues of an implementation 
intention attract attention more easily than situational cues that are not included 
in an implementation intention? It is hard to assess the current focus of 
attention directly, but research has demonstrated that human attention is limited 
in capacity (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Wickens, 1980). In other words: If 
attentional resources are attracted by the situational cue (X), less attention can 
be paid to other information. Hence, responses to other information diminish 
(i.e., slow down in most of the paradigms). Several paradigms make use of this 
effect to measure the attention attracted by distractors (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974; Johnston & Heinz, 1978). 
 
Using the dichotomic listening task (Johnston & Heinz, 1978), the only 
research addressing the impact of implementation intentions on attention found 
that the situational cue specified in an implementation intention was disruptive 
to focused attention (Steller, 1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 1993). In this task, 
participants had to shadow (repeat) words that were presented on one ear 
(attended channel) and to ignore words presented on the other ear (non-
attended channel). In addition to this dichotomic listening task they had to turn 
off a probe light that was flashing in irregular intervals as a subsidiary second 
task. It was found that the shadowing performance and the response speed on 
the subsidiary second task were diminished if situational cues from 
implementation intentions were presented on a non-attended channel. In two 
                                                 
1 This section has been modified and submitted for publication (Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006). 
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studies these distracting effects were only found for participants holding 
the relevant goal intention and the implementation intention, but not for 
participants in a control condition. The control group neither formed the relevant 
goal intention nor the implementation intention. In sum, these results nicely 
demonstrate that situational cues attract people’s attention even during the 
pursuit of other goals, if a goal intention and an implementation intention 
including these cues have been formed. However, these studies do not reveal if 
just a goal intention or a goal intention plus an implementation intention is 
necessary for the effect on attention as both levels of attention have been 
confounded in the manipulations of Steller (1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 1993). 
 
Recent findings by Moskowitz (2002) question whether the 
implementation intention is driving the attention attraction effect in the studies of 
Steller (1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 1993). Moskowitz found differences in 
attention attraction between cues for uncompleted and completed goals (i.e., 
goals, participants had subjectively not fully achieved or successfully achieved, 
respectively). Only when goals were not fully completed (i.e., participants still 
hold a goal intention), cues associated with these goals attracted attention, 
even during the pursuit of a focal task (i.e., slowed down responses). The cues 
used by Moskowitz (2002) were semantic associations of the goal and not 
situational cues, but means and other associations such as situational cues are 
stored in a common cognitive network just like all other mental representations 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000; Shah, 2003). 
Thus, the effects found by Moskowitz (2002) will most likely also be found for 
relevant situational cues. In sum, findings suggest that cues relevant for an 
uncompleted goal already attract attention. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the studies by 
Steller (1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 1993) and Moskowitz (2002)? Steller’s 
research found attention attraction effects in participants who formed a goal 
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intention and an implementation intention but not in participants that held 
neither. In Moskowitz’s research (2002) goals without implementation intentions 
were also found to impact on attention. Hence, the effect of goal intentions 
might fully account for the attention attraction effects reported by Steller (1992, 
cited in Gollwitzer, 1993). Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the existing 
research, whether an implementation intention contributes above and beyond a 
goal intention to attention attraction effects.  
 
It is the aim of the present research to examine the effect 
implementation intentions have beyond goal intentions on attention to the 
situational cues they specify. Following the assumption of Gollwitzer and 
Schaal (1998) it was predicted that implementation intentions attract attention 
above and beyond goal intentions. As an indicator of these attention attraction 
effects, the attention towards other cues and thus the pursuit of other goals is 
expected to be diminished. Less attentional resources should remain if 
implementation intention cues occupy parts of our limited attentional capacity. 
 
Second, a positive relation between the attention attracted by the 
situational cues from implementation intentions and improved goal attainment 
from the same intention is predicted, because the attention to situational cues is 
the first step towards action initiation. 
Overview of studies on attentional side effects of implementation intentions 
The present research examines whether the situational cues (X) attract 
more attention after forming an implementation intention (compared to only 
holding the goal intention the implementation intention is based on). To 
measure attention attraction, implementation intention cues appeared during 
the pursuit of competing (sub)goals. In Study 1, attention attraction effects of 
implementation intentions compared to goal intentions were examined in an 
attention-concentration task. Whereas the implementation intention was 
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directed at one subgoal of this task, the predicted diminished performance 
through the attraction of attention was measured concerning a different subgoal 
that was pursued simultaneously. To avoid the direct competition of the two 
subgoals, Study 2 and 3 assessed the impact of forming an implementation 
intention on attention towards the situational cue during the pursuit of another 
goal. Moreover, to examine the relation between attention attraction effects and 
improved performance effects (i.e., the actual benefits of implementation 
intentions), Study 3 measured attention attraction effects and improved 
performance resulting from implementation intentions one after the other. 
4.2 Study 1 
In Study 1 an attention-concentration task in which overall good 
performance required the pursuit of two subgoals was used to examine 
attention attraction by situational cues from implementation intentions. The two 
subgoals were to mark two types of signs between numerous similar other 
signs, namely the letter d with two lines above or below and the letter p with 
one line above or below in a restricted amount of time. In the experimental 
condition, one subgoal was furnished with an implementation intention (marking 
ds with two lines), whereas the other subgoal was not (marking ps with one 
line). The attention attraction effect from the implementation intention was 
expected to increase performance for the subgoal to mark the critical ds, but to 
diminish the performance for the subgoal to mark the critical ps (compared 
respectively to the performance in a control condition where participants held 
both subgoals but no implementation intention). The latter was expected, 
because in the current task the limited attention resources were expected to be 
attracted by the critical ds and, thus, distracted from the critical ps. In sum, for 
participants in the implementation intention condition fewer hits and more 
misses on critical ps were predicted than in the control condition. At the same 
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time, the implementation intentions were hypothesized to result in more hits and 
fewer misses for critical ds.  
4.2.1 Method 
Design and Participants 
An experiment with a mixed 2 x 2 design with Intention (implementation 
intention vs. control intention) as between-subjects factor and Sign (ps with one 
line, ds with two lines) as within-subjects factor was conducted. Twenty-six 
female and 15 male undergraduate students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University 
of Jena (Germany) with a mean age of 22 years (range 19-28) took part in the 
experiment in exchange for 5 €. 
Procedure 
Three to six participants attended per session. Before the actual task 
started, participants ostensibly received “training” that actually served as a 
manipulation of the Intention (see below). The instruction informed them that 
the administered test is often used in personal assessment to increase the task 
relevance. Additionally, 10 € were awarded to the three participants showing 
the best overall task performance to increase motivation. First, participants 
worked through an example to raise awareness for the task difficulty (given the 
time restriction). Then, participants simultaneously started to work on the 
concentration test. A modified D2 attention-concentration task (Brickenkamp, 
1978) served to measure the effects of implementations intentions on the 
pursuit of the two subgoals. The test consists of 14 rows of ds and ps with 
different numbers of lines above and/or below. Each row is composed of 47 
signs. In the original D2 task participants have to mark all ds with two lines only, 
whereas our participants had to mark additionally ps with one line to include a 
second subgoal. Hence, the following signs had to be marked:    ,   ,,   ,,     ,    . 
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The time for each row was restricted to 25 seconds. Afterwards the 
experimenter gave a signal indicating that the next row should be started. 
Because of the time restriction, it is hardly possible to mark all critical letters 
and the task requires full attention for good performance. Hence, forming an 
implementation intention for one subgoal (e.g., critical ds) should be especially 
beneficial for the pursuit of this subgoal, when implementation intentions cause 
attention attraction effects. At the same time, the performance on the second 
subgoal should diminish, as the attention is distracted from the other critical 
cue. Finally, they worked through a short questionnaire, were debriefed, paid, 
and thanked. 
Manipulation 
The “training” that served as a manipulation of Intention requested 
participants to memorize three intentions. On the subsequent page they were 
asked to remember these intentions and to write them down. In the 
implementation intention condition these intentions specified when to act in 
order to mark all critical ds (“If I see a d with two lines above (   ), I mark it“, “If I 
see a d with two lines below (   ), I mark it“, “If I see a d with one line above and 
one line below (   ), I mark it“). Thus, the intentions referred only to the critical 
ds. Although the critical ps were part of the general task instructions and 
described as equally important, they were not included in the implementation 
intentions to allow for measuring the attention attraction of critical ds on the 
performance on the second subgoal (critical ps). In the control intention 
condition the three intentions neither referred to critical ps nor to critical ds (“I 
will try to solve the task as well as possible“, “I will try to solve the task as 
quickly as possible“, and “I will try to solve the task as accurately as possible”). 
These control intentions were chosen to avoid influences on the relation 
between the subgoals. Thus, the instructions towards the critical ps were 
identical in both conditions. The critical ds were part of a goal and an 
implementation intention in the implementation intention condition but only part 
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of a goal in the control intention condition. In both conditions it was once again 
clearly stated just before the task that participants were to mark both types of 
signs.  
Measures 
Motivation: Before participants started with the D2 task, they had to 
indicate their motivation for the upcoming task on a 7-point scale (“How 
important is it to you to perform as well as possible on the following task?”, 1 
(unimportant) to 7 (very important)). 
 
Performance: Attention attraction was assessed using performance in 
the attention-concentration task. For critical ps and ds, hits (i.e., correctly 
marked signs) and misses (i.e., critical signs that were not marked) were 
counted separately. Misses were counted relatively to the individual’s 
performance. That is, in each row misses were counted only within the range 
from the beginning of a row to the last correctly marked sign in this row. 
 
Additional checks: In the final questionnaire the perceived performance, 
distraction, task difficulty, effect of the “training” and control questions were 
administered [“How do you rate your performance on ps with one line / ds with 
two lines?”, 1 (very low) to 7 (very high); “Did you have many distracting 
thoughts during the task?”, 1 (very little distracting thoughts) to 7 (many 
distracting thoughts); “How difficult was the task for you?”, 1 (difficult) to 7 
(easy), “Were the intentions formed in the training helpful for the task?”, 1 (not 
helpful at all) to 7 (very helpful); “Did you concentrate more on the ds or on the 
ps during the task?”, 1 (concentrated more on ds) to 7 (concentrated more on 
ps); “How important was it to you to perform as well as possible in the 
concentration task?”, 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important); “How quick 
were you?”, 1 (not quick at all) to 7 (very quick)]. 
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4.2.2 Results 
The motivation measure revealed no differences between stated 
motivation after the training in either condition, F (1, 39) < .86; p = .357, η²p < 
.022. Participants in the implementation intention condition (M = 5.75, SD = 
1.25) as well as in the control intention condition (M = 5.38, SD = 1.28) were 
highly motivated to perform as well as possible. 
 
For performance, it was predicted that participants in the implementation 
intention condition show a diminished performance on critical ps (less hits, 
more misses) and an improved performance on critical ds (more hits, less 
misses) compared to the control intention condition. To test these predictions, 
separate χ² tests for critical ps and critical ds with hits and misses and the two 
intention conditions (implementation intention vs. control intention) were 
computed. 
Table 1: Mean hits and misses (standard deviations) per person for critical ds 
with two lines and critical ps with one line in the D2 task as a function 
of Intention (Study 1, N = 41). 
 D2 Task - Hits D2 Task - Misses 
 Implementation 
intention condition 
Control intention 
condition 
Implementation 
intention condition
Control intention 
condition 
Critical 
ds 
167.35  
(31.42) 
162.38  
(43.32) 
130.65 
(31.42) 
135.62 
(43.32) 
Critical 
ps 
34.95 
(13.36) 
40.57 
(4.51) 
16.05 
(13.36) 
10.43 
(4.51) 
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As predicted, the performance on critical ps showed a significant 
difference between conditions, χ²(1, N = 41) = 9.60; p < .001 (see Table 1). 
Participants in the implementation intention condition had less hits (M = 34.952, 
SD = 13.36) and more misses (M = 16.05, SD = 13.36) on critical ps than 
participants in the control intention condition (hits: M = 40.57, SD = 4.51; 
misses: M = 10.43, SD = 4.51). In addition, the performance on critical ds 
tended to differ between conditions, χ²(1, N = 41) = 3.43, p = .010. Participants 
in the implementation intention condition marked more ds correctly (M = 167.35, 
SD = 31.42) and missed less critical ds (M = 130.65, SD = 31.42) than 
participants in the control intention condition (hits: M = 162.38, SD = 43.32; 
misses: M = 135.62, SD = 43.32).  
 
Closer inspection of the data showed that two participants in the 
implementation intention condition left out all critical ps. This might indicate that 
they did not see the critical ps as important even though the instructions asked 
them to mark both types of letters several times. After excluding these two 
participants, a marginal difference between conditions on hits and misses for 
critical ps remained, χ²(1, N = 39) = 2.99; p = .10. Participants in the 
implementation intention condition showed a tendency to have less hits (M = 
38.83, SD = 6.31) and more misses (M = 4.78, SD = 5.49) critical ps compared 
to participants in the control intention condition (hits: M = 40.57, SD = 4.51; 
misses: M = 3.76, SD = 4.38). For critical ds the differences between conditions 
on hits and misses remained, χ²(1, N = 39) = 42.40; p < .001. Participants in the 
implementation intention condition had more hits (M = 166.06, SD = 32.94) and 
less misses (M = 20.28, SD = 26.25) critical ds compared to participants in the 
control intention condition (hits: M = 162.38, SD = 43.32; misses: M = 31.19, SD 
= 43.78). 
                                                 
2 For the sake of reading convenience, participants mean numbers of marked and missed cues 
for ps and ds in the D2 task are reported, whereas the test was based on sums within 
conditions.  
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The results of the final questionnaire revealed no differences between 
conditions, all Fs < 1.2, all ps > .25, all η²p < .03. Participants did not differ 
between conditions in their perception of performance, distractions, task 
difficulty or the impact of the training ( “How do you rate your performance on 
ps with one line?”, Mimplementation intention; (ii)  = 4.60, SDii = 1.23, Mcontrol intention; (ci) = 
4.62, SDci = 1.28; “How do you rate your performance on ds with two lines?”, Mii 
= 3.45; SDii = 1.40, Mci = 3.86, SDci = 1.53; “How quick have you been?”, Mii = 
3.70, SDii = 1.03, Mci = 3.71, SDci = 1.79; “Did you have many distracting 
thoughts during the task?”, Mii = 2.65, SDii = 1.53, Mci = 2.48, SDci = 1.44; “How 
difficult was the task for you?”, Mii = 4.50, SDii = 1.40, Mci = 4.48, SDci = 1.50; 
“Were the intentions formed in the training helpful for the task?”, Mii = 3.21, SDii 
= 1.72, Mci = 3.14, SDci = 1.46). Most importantly, participants in the 
implementation intention condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.26) did not report that they 
focused more on ds than on ps compared to participants in the control intention 
condition (M = 3.14, SD = 1.68). Finally, stated motivation replicated the 
findings of the motivation measure. Overall it was high and did not differ 
between conditions (“How important was it to you to perform as well as possible 
in the concentration task?”, Mii = 5.75, SDii = 1.25, Mci = 5.38, SDci = 1.28). 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In this Study, first evidence for attention attraction effects from 
implementation intentions beyond goals was found in an attention-concentration 
task. Forming an implementation intention for one subgoal (ds) led to 
diminished performance for the second subgoal (ps) that was not furnished with 
an implementation intention (compared to a control condition without any 
implementation intentions). In addition to these attention attraction effects of 
implementation intentions, improved performance was shown for the subgoal 
the implementation intention was formed for. No differences between conditions 
were found concerning the motivation, the perceived effectiveness of the 
training (i.e., formed intention) and other self-report measures. 
4 Implementation intentions and attentional side effects   50 
 
However, Study 1 has at least two limitations. First, the intention 
conditions did not contain the same information. Whereas the critical ds were 
part of three intentions in the implementation intention condition, they were not 
included in the intentions of the control intention condition. Thus, it cannot be 
excluded that the accessibility of the critical cues differed between the intention 
conditions. To control for accessibility effects, both intention conditions should 
contain the same information with regard to the situational cues of the 
implementation intention. 
 
Second, two participants did not mark any of the critical ps. This could 
be a result of differences in perceived importance attributed to the two 
subgoals, which might have been reinforced by a characteristic of the materials: 
There were far more critical ds than critical ps. Thus, the effects found in Study 
1 cannot unequivocally be attributed to attention. To rule this out, attention 
attraction effects and improved performance effects of implementation 
intentions will be measured in separate tasks in the following two studies.  
4.3 Study 2 
To further examine attention attraction effects of implementation 
intentions and to address the limitations of Study 1 a second study was 
conducted. An improved manipulation with identical information in both intention 
conditions was used to control for the accessibility of the situational cues. To 
avoid a bias towards the goals furnished with an implementation intention, 
attention attraction effects were measured in a different task than the one the 
implementation intentions were formed for. Finally, a more fine-grained 
attention measure than in Study 1 was used. 
 
It was predicted that attention towards lexical decisions would be 
disrupted if unrelated situational cues from implementation intentions formed for 
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a different task were present as irrelevant cues, because these cues attract 
attention. Hence, slower reaction times in the lexical decisions were expected in 
the implementation intention condition compared to the control condition if a 
situational cue was present, but not when neutral cues were present. 
4.3.1 Method 
Design and Participants 
Study 2 had a mixed 2 x 2 design with Intention (implementation 
intention vs. control intention) as a between-subjects factor and Distractor 
(critical distractor, neutral distractor) as a within-subjects factor. Twenty-one 
female and six male undergraduate students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University 
Jena with a mean age of 23 years (range 18-28) took part in the experiment in 
exchange for 5 €. 
Procedure  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in front of a 
computer and were informed that they would work on two different studies 
combined for convenience. First, participants worked on a categorization task 
that served to motivate the formation of a goal.  
 
The categorization task was similar to the musical instrument and 
weapon implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998). 
Participants had to categorize cues by pressing either the left or the right 
control key on a computer keyboard. The task consisted of 10 trials where 
words had to be categorized as pleasant versus unpleasant, 10 trials where 
words had to be categorized as music instrument or weapon and 20 trials with 
the value-incongruent combinations of music instruments and unpleasant words 
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on one key and weapons as well as pleasant words on the other key3. 
Participants generally experience the value incongruent trials of an implicit 
association test as difficult (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nado, 2001). This 
experience was used to motivate participants to train before carrying out the 
categorization task a second time. This training was in fact the intention 
manipulation (see below). After the training, participants worked on a seemingly 
unrelated Study, which was in fact the assessment of the attention attraction 
effect. This intersection was justified by telling participants that the training 
would take some time to enfold its optimal effects. After the assessment of the 
attention attraction, participants filled in a short questionnaire. The announced 
repetition of the first categorization task was actually not included in the Study. 
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed, paid and thanked.  
Manipulation 
To manipulate participant’s intentions, they were “trained” for the 
inconsistent trials of an implicit association task on flowers and insects. 4 In both 
conditions they formed the goal to press the left control key, if they see a flower 
or an unpleasant word and to press the right control key, if they see an insect or 
a pleasant word. In the implementation intention condition, participants had to 
memorize four implementation intentions (“If I see an ‘unpleasant’ word, I press 
the left control key.” “If I see a ‘pleasant’ word, I press the right control key.”, “If I 
see a ‘flower’, I press the left control key.”, “If I see an ‘insect’, I press the right 
control key.”). In the control intention condition participants furnished the goal 
                                                 
3 The congruent block and the relearning phase of the original implicit association test were not 
included, to keep the key that had to be pressed for a category constant throughout the whole 
study. This was necessary to allow forming an implementation intention for a category key 
(e.g., left control key for music instruments, right control key for weapons) that is true during 
all trials of the task. 
 
4 The training used different categories (flowers, insects) than the first categorization task 
(music-instruments, weapons). This change of categories served to avoid a heightened 
accessibility of the cues through the repeated activation in the first categorization task before 
the attention attraction measurement. 
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with six control intentions (“I respond to a ‘flower’ as quickly and accurate as 
possible”, “I respond to an ‘insect’ as quickly and accurate as possible”, “I 
respond to an ‘unpleasant’ word as quickly and accurate as possible”, “I 
respond to a ‘pleasant’ word as quickly and accurate as possible”, “I press the 
left control key as quickly and accurate as possible”, “I press the right control 
key as quickly and accurate as possible.”). Thus, the situational cues of the 
implementation intentions (“flower”, “insect”, pleasant word, and unpleasant 
word) were included in the control intentions as well as in the implementation 
intentions as an attempt to control the accessibility of these cues between 
conditions. On the subsequent page, participants had to write down the 
memorized intentions. This part of the instructions was given on paper, 
whereas the rest of the Study was conducted at the computer. 
Measures  
Attention attraction: To measure attention attraction effects 
independently of performance effects of implementation intentions, a modified 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) was employed. In this task participants 
were presented with two cues on the computer screen. One cue was written in 
non-italic letters (distractor) and one in italic letters (target). Participant’s task 
was to decide if the cue written in italic letters (target) was a word or a non-word 
(e.g., cup, vase, vehicle, meirn, berse, felerod) by pressing either the left or the 
right control key. Thus, only the targets were relevant for the task. Including the 
target type as a factor in the analyses reported below did not lead to any 
significant effects involving this factor or to any changes in the reported results. 
Therefore, target type was not included in analyses reported below. Regarding 
the distractors participants were told that they were just to increase the 
complexity of the task and should thus be ignored. But in fact the distractor 
cues served to operationalize the Distractor factor: Neutral distractors were 
neutral words (e.g., clothing, vase); critical distractors were the situational cues 
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from the implementation intentions (flower, insect). In addition, non-words (e.g., 
felerod, geluit) were presented as distractors to support the plausibility of the 
cover story. The extent to which the response speed in this lexical decision task 
differs between trials with a critical distractor versus a neutral distractor 
indicates the attention attraction effect of the critical distractor. 
 
Targets and distractors were placed vertically in the center of the screen 
(17 inch, 1024 x 768 dots) in 24 pt letters with double spacing between them. 
Overall, the flanker task consisted of 10 practice trials plus 64 trials. Each trial 
started 250 ms after the preceding trial with a fixation cross that was presented 
for 500 ms. Targets as well as distractors consisted of 32 words and 32 non-
words. The distractors contained 8 critical words and 24 neutral words. 
 
Two indices were calculated from the response time data. A neutral 
distractor index was computed using the mean reaction times to target cues 
(words and non-words) simultaneously present with a neutral distractor (neutral 
words). The critical distractor index consisted of the mean reaction times to 
target cues (words and non-words) that were simultaneously present with a 
critical word as distractor (i.e., the situational cues flower and insect). 
Final questionnaire: To control for intentional strategies the following 
questions were asked: “Did the training influence your performance on the 
word-or non-word task?” [1 (not at all) to 9 (very much)], “Did you have 
distracting thoughts that hindered you during the word or non-word task?” [1 
(very little distracting thoughts) to 9 (many distracting thoughts)], “How 
concentrated were you during the tasks?” [1 (not concentrated at all) to 7 (very 
concentrated)], “How quick were you?” [1 (not quick at all) to 7 (very quick)] and 
“How difficult was the tasks for you overall?” [1 (difficult) to 7 (easy)]. 
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4.3.2 Results 
Flanker task  
For the analysis of the flanker task all responses faster than 150 ms, 
more than 2 standard deviations slower than the mean response time (> 1660 
ms), or were incorrect were omitted from the analyses reported below (overall 
15.12 percent of the trials). Error rates in the flanker task did not differ between 
conditions (Mii = 11.92, SDii = 7.65, Mci = 8.29, SDci = 4.87), F (1, 25) = 2.20, p 
= .15, η²p = .081. 
 
In order to test the predictions towards the attention attraction effects of 
intentions, a mixed MANCOVA was calculated with Intention (implementation 
intention vs. control intention) as between-subjects factor, Distractor (critical 
distractor, neutral distractor) as within-subjects factor, and the mean reaction 
time of the residual trials that were not included in the critical comparison (i.e., 
non-word distractors) as covariate to control for interindividual differences in 
mean response times5.  
 
Table 2: Mean estimates (standard deviations) of response times from 
the flanker task as a function of Intention and Distractor (Study 2, N = 27). 
 Implementation intention 
condition 
Control intention 
condition 
Flanker task 
Critical distractors 
 
1048.29 (81.02) a 
 
982.72 (80.97) b  
Neutral distractors 998.81 (33.93)  986.78 (33.94)  
Note: Within rows, means having different superscripts a b differ significantly at a level 
of p < .05. 
                                                 
5 There was a main effect of the covariate, F (1, 24) = 290.39, p < .001, η²p = .924, which 
implies that the mean response times differed between participants. No interaction been this 
covariate and distractor, F (1, 24) = .39, p = .537, η²p = .016 and no main effect of condition 
was found, F (1, 24) = 3.05, p = .094, η²p = .113. 
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The expected Intention x Distractor interaction was found, F (1, 24) = 
4.35, p = .048, η²p = .153 (see Table 2). In line with the predictions, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that reactions to target cues appearing simultaneously 
with critical distractors took longer in the implementation intention condition (M 
= 1048.29 ms, SD = 81.02) than in the control intention condition (M = 982.72 
ms, SD = 80.97), F (1, 24) = 4.34, p = .048, η²p = .153. No differences in 
reactions between the implementation intention (M = 998.81 ms, SD = 33.93) 
and the control intention condition (M = 986.78 ms, SD = 33.94) occurred when 
neutral distractors simultaneously appeared with target cues, F (1, 24) = 1.06, p 
= .314, η²p = .042.  
Questionnaire 
The items of the final questionnaire revealed no differences between 
conditions, all Fs (1, 25) < 0.25. Participants in the implementation intention 
condition as well as in the control intention condition did perceive few attention 
attraction (“Did the training influence your performance on the word-or non-
word task?”, Mii = 3.54, SDii = 2.60, Mci = 3.13, SDci = 1.69; “Did you have 
distracting thoughts that hindered you during the word or non-word task?”, Mii = 
2.69, SDii = 1.75, Mci = 3.00, SDci = 1.89) and did not differ on the control 
questions (“How concentrated were you during the tasks?”, Mii = 6.54, SDii = 
1.45, Mci = 6.80, SDci = 1.32; “How quick were you overall?”, Mii = 5.69, SDii = 
1.18, Mci = 5.80, SDci = 1.82; “How difficult were the tasks for you overall?”, Mii 
= 6.15, SDii = 1.91, Mci = 6.27, SDci = 1.91). 
Discussion 
In Study 2 situational cues from implementation intentions attracted 
attention, when they appeared as distractors during the pursuit of another goal. 
Participants’ responses slowed down when a situational cue from an 
implementation attention appeared close to a target stimulus. This was found 
4 Implementation intentions and attentional side effects   57 
 
comparing participants holding a goal furnished with an implementation 
intention with participants holding only the goal. Both groups did not differ in 
their response speed when other distractors were shown. Self-reports again 
suggested that participants were not aware of attention attraction effects of 
implementation intentions at least not more than when holding a goal intention. 
In sum, this Study replicates the attention attraction effects of situational cues 
from implementation intentions. At the same time, the two main limitations of 
Study 1 were ruled out in this Study: The two subgoals were not pursued at the 
same time and the two conditions were parallel in terms of the content of the 
intentions. 
 
Nonetheless, Study 2 leaves two open questions. First, it does not 
provide evidence for the functionality of the implementation intentions and the 
relation between the attention attraction effect and the improved performance 
from implementation intentions. Second, the same behavior (pressing control 
keys) the implementation intention was formed for had to be elicited in the 
flanker task. Thus, the distraction in the flanker task might be limited to behavior 
included in the implementation intention.  
4.4 Study 3 
Study 3 was designed to examine the relation between attention 
attraction effects and improved performance from implementation intentions. At 
the same time, this Study aimed to test whether the attention attraction effect of 
implementation intentions is limited to cases were the behavior specified in the 
implementation intention had to be shown to pursue another goal as in Study 2. 
However, it was expected that the attention attraction effect of situational cues 
from implementation intentions would generalize to situations where any 
behavior is shown.  
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To test this prediction, the task and the goal the implementation intention 
was formed for was different from Study 2. Moreover, the flanker task had to be 
adjusted. This time participants formed an implementation intention for a letter 
detection task in which participants are asked to mark instances of a certain 
letter in a printout of a text with a pen. Usually, a lot of letters are overlooked 
because texts are not processed letter by letter but simple words are 
recognized as a whole (i.e., missing-letter effect, Healy, 1994). Webb and 
Sheeran (2004) provided evidence that implementation intentions improve the 
performance in this task substantially. As in Study 2, participants first formed 
implementation intentions for the letter detection task, then they worked on the 
flanker task and finally, they had to mark all ds in a short text.  
 
When an implementation intention cue (D/d), was present as distractor in 
the flanker task, slower reactions were expected in the implementation intention 
compared to the control intention condition. No performance differences 
between conditions should occur, when a neutral cue was present as distractor. 
Thus, an Intention by Distractor interaction was predicted. For the letter 
detection task, an improved performance was expected in the implementation 
intention condition compared to the control intention condition. Finally, a 
positive correlation between the extent of attention attraction in the flanker task 
and the performance in the letter detection task was expected.  
4.4.1 Method 
Design and Participants 
In this experiment Intention (implementation intention vs. control 
intention) served as a between-subjects factor and Distractor (critical 
distractors, neutral distractors) as a within-subjects factor. Eighteen female and 
19 male undergraduate students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena with a 
mean age of 22 years (Range 18-34) took part in exchange for 5 €. Three 
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participants had to be excluded from the analysis, because they did not follow 
the instructions. In an open-ended question in the final questionnaire they 
indicated that they formed additional implementation intentions related to the 
phonetic information of the words for the letter detection task. 
Procedure 
The procedure followed the one of Study 2 except for the following 
alterations: There was no categorization task at the beginning, but the 
participants were immediately informed about the letter detection task and 
started with the “training” that served to manipulate the Intention (see below). 
The flanker task immediately following the manipulation used two single letters 
(instead of two words) as stimuli. The letters were placed vertically in the center 
of the screen and were presented with double spacing between them. Target 
letters were written in italics, distractor letters in non-italics. Participants had to 
indicate whether the target letter was a vowel (a, e, i, u) by pressing the left 
control key or a consonant (d, k, m, s) by pressing the right control key. The 
situational cue from the implementation intention (i.e., the letter d) served as 
critical distractor and a set of other consonant letters as control distractors (k, 
m, s). In addition, vowels (a, e, i, u) were presented as distractors to support the 
plausibility of the cover story. Overall, the flanker task consisted of 64 trials plus 
10 practice trials. Targets as well as distractors consisted of 32 vowels and 32 
consonants. The consonants used as distractors contained 8 critical d 
consonants and 24 neutral consonants. Including the target type as a factor in 
the analyses reported below did not lead to any significant effects involving this 
factor or to any changes in the reported results. Therefore, target type was not 
included in analyses reported below.  
 
After the flanker task, participants worked on a letter detection task, 
which was included to measure improved performance effects of 
implementation intentions. The materials were taken from Müsseler, Koriat, and 
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Nißlein (2000). The letter detection task consisted of twelve sentences (see 
Appendix) that were printed on a standard paper-size sheet in portrait format in 
12 pt Times New Roman. Participants had 80 seconds to work through these 
sentences and to mark all d letters. The sentences contained 39 ds in function 
words as well as other words. The letter detection task followed the flanker task 
to ensure that the goal for the letter detection task was uncompleted during the 
measurement of the attention attraction effect in the flanker task. Finally, 
participants filled in a short questionnaire, were thoroughly debriefed, paid and 
thanked. 
Manipulation 
The Intention manipulation was labeled as training for the letter detection 
task. First, participants in both conditions formed the goal to mark all D/d letters 
in the letter detection task. Next, they had to memorize and to write down 
intentions that were introduced as a useful method to improve their 
performance in the upcoming letter detection task. In the experimental 
condition, participants memorized an implementation intention (“If I see a letter  
D/d I will mark it.”). In the control intention condition, the intention for the letter 
detection task was just a replication of the goal, as it was mentioned in the task 
instructions (“I will mark all letter D/ds.”).  
Measures 
Flanker task: Two indices were calculated for the analysis of the flanker 
task: the mean response time on trials with neutral distractors (k, m, s) and the 
mean response time on trials with the critical distractor (d). For the analysis of 
the relation between the attention attraction effect and the improved 
performance effect of implementation intentions, an attention attraction score 
was computed by subtracting the mean response time on trials with neutral 
distractors from the mean response time on trials with critical distractors. 
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Performance: The absolute number of marked ds in the letter detection 
task was used as a measure of performance. Overall 39 ds had to be marked, 
including 6 that were difficult to detect in specific function words (i.e., in German 
der, die, and das). 
Questionnaire: The items of the final questionnaire assessed the 
perceived attentional attraction [“Did you have distracting thoughts that 
hindered you during the processing of the vowel or consonant task?”, 1 (very 
few distracting thoughts) to 9 (many distracting thoughts)], the perceived impact 
of the intentions on the performance [“Did the training improve your 
performance in the vowel or consonant task?”, 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much); 
“How do you rate your performance with regard to marking all ds in the letter 
detection task?”, 1 (many d overlooked) to 7 (no d overlooked)] as well as 
control questions [“How difficult were the tasks for you?”, 1 (difficult) to 7 
(easy)]. 
4.4.2 Results 
Flanker Task 
For the analysis of the flanker task all responses that were given faster 
than 150 ms and 2 standard deviations slower than the mean response time (> 
1888 ms) as well as wrong answers were omitted from the calculation (overall 
8.92 percent of the trials). Error rates in the flanker task did not differ between 
conditions, F (1, 32) = 0.77, p = .387, η²p = .023. 
 
As in Study 2, a mixed MANCOVA was calculated with Intention 
(implementation intention vs. control intention) as between-subjects factor, 
Distractor (critical distractor, neutral distractor) as within-subjects factor and the 
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mean reaction time of the residual trials that were not included in the critical 
comparison (i.e., vowel distractors) as covariate6.  
Table 3: Mean estimates (standard deviation) of response times from the 
flanker task as a function of Intention and Distractor (Study 3, N = 34). 
 Implementation intention 
condition 
Control intention 
condition 
Flanker task 
Critical distractor (d) 
 
969.41 (73.65) a  
 
896.27 (78.28) b 
Neutral distractors 973.84 (48.16) 993.64 (51.20)  
Note: Within rows, means having different superscripts a b differ significantly at a level 
of p < .05. 
 
In line with our hypothesis, the Intention x Distractor interaction was 
found, F (1, 31) =11.38, p = .002, η²p = .269 (see Table 3). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that reaction times to target cues appearing 
simultaneously with critical distractors were longer in the implementation 
intention (M = 969.41 ms, SD = 73.65) than in the control intention condition (M 
= 896.27 ms, SD = 78.28), F (1, 31) = 8.03, p = .008, η²p = .206. No differences 
in reactions between the implementation intention (M = 973.84 ms, SD = 48.16) 
and the control intention condition (M = 993.64 ms, SD = 51.20) were found 
when target cues simultaneously appeared with neutral distractors, F (1, 31) = 
1.22, p = .277, η²p = .038.  
                                                 
6 There was a main effect of the covariate, F (1, 31) = 519.25, p < .001, η²p = .944. No 
interaction been this covariate and distractor, F (1, 31) = 1.24, p = .273, η²p = .039, and no 
main effect of condition emerged, F (1, 31) = 2.34, p = .136, η²p = .070. 
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Letter-detection task 
For the letter detection task the predicted effect of Intention was found, F 
(1, 32) = 5.47, p= .026, η²p = .146. Participants in the implementation intention 
condition (M= 29.06, SD = 3.31) marked significantly more ds compared to 
participants in the control intention condition (M= 26.00, SD = 4.19).  
Table 4: Mean number (standard deviation) of marked ds from the letter 
detection task as a function of Intention (Study 3, N = 34). 
 Implementation intention 
condition 
Control intention 
condition 
Letter detection task 
(numbers of d letters 
 marked) 
 
29.06 (4.19) a 
 
26.00 (3.31) b 
Note: Within rows, means having different superscripts a b differ significantly at a level 
of p < .05. 
 
Importantly, these differences were also maintained for 6 difficult 
detectable ds included in the task. Participants in the implementation intention 
condition (M = 3.61, SD = 2.18) marked more difficult detectable ds compared 
to the control intention condition (M = 2.5, SD = 2.31), F (1, 31) = 4.17, p= .049, 
η²p = .115. 
 
In line with our hypothesis, a positive relation between attention 
attraction effect and the performance was found, r = .37, N = 34, p = .028. The 
more attention the ds attracted in the flanker task the better was the 
performance in the letter detection task. 
 
To test whether the impact of the implementation intention on the 
performance resulted from the attention attracted by situational cues, a 
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mediation analysis following the procedural suggestions of Baron and Kenny 
(1986) was computed. As reported above the Intention effected the attention 
attraction score (β = .49, p = .003). The significant impact of the Intention on the 
performance reported above (β = .38, p = .026) dropped below the conventional 
level of statistical significance (β = .26, p = .169) when the attention attraction 
score (β = .25, p = .185) was entered as second predictor into a multiple 
regression. Even though, the decline in the effect of the Intention after 
controlling for the attention attraction points to an indirect effect of the Intention 
on the performance via the attraction, this effect was not significant (Sobel t 
(32) = 1.29, p = .207). When performance is entered as second predictor (β = 
.22, p = .185) in the regression of the attention attraction score on the Intention, 
the effect of the attention remains significant (β = .40, p = .003). Hence, there is 
also not evidence for an indirect effect of the Intention on the attention attraction 
via the performance (Sobel t (32) < 1).  
Questionnaire 
Participants did not experience a different amount of distraction in the 
flanker task (Mii = 2.44, SDii = 0.92, Mci = 3.06, SDci = 1.77), F = 1.69, p = .203, 
η²p = .050. The intentions were perceived as slightly more useful in the 
implementation intention condition (M = 4.89, SD = 0.96) compared to the 
control intention condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.53), F (1, 32) = 3.52, p = .070, η²p 
= .102. In addition, the perceived performance in the letter detection task was 
rated as higher in the implementation intention condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.06) 
compared to the control intention condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.48), F (1, 32) = 
5.30, p= .028, η²p = .142. The tasks were rated as equally difficult in both 
condition (Mii = 5.00, SDii = 1.63; Mci = 5.11, SDci = 1.64), F (1, 32) = 0.39, p = 
.845, η²p = .001. 
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4.4.3 Discussion 
Replicating the findings of Study 2, Study 3 also found the attention 
attraction effects of situational cues from implementation intentions during the 
pursuit of a goal that the implementation intentions were not formed for. In line 
with our hypothesis, participants slowed down in the flanker task when 
situational cues from implementation intentions appeared as distractors 
compared to participants that did not form an implementation intention. No 
differences in reaction times were found between Intention conditions, if target 
cues were presented with a neutral distractor.  
 
For the letter detection task, better performance was found in the 
implementation intention compared to the control intention condition. 
Participants in the implementation intention condition marked more ds overall 
as well as more difficult detectable ds than participants in the control intention 
condition. These results replicate the findings of Webb and Sheeran (2004). 
Furthermore, the expected positive correlation between the attention attraction 
effects and the improved performance effects of implementation intentions was 
found. The more intentions attracted attention in the unrelated flanker task, the 
better the performance in the letter-detection task. The questionnaire indicated 
that participants recognized the beneficial effects of the implementation 
intention for the letter detection task but not the disruptive effects in the flanker 
task. This again replicates the findings from Studies 1 and 2. 
4.5 Discussion attentional side effects of implementation 
intentions 
The aim of the present research was to examine attentional effects of 
implementation intentions. More precisely, it was predicted that implementation 
intentions lead to attention attraction effects for situational cues included in 
them, above and beyond goals (Moskowitz, 2002) and that these effects are 
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related to improved performance effects of implementation intentions. Overall, 
the results of the present studies confirmed these predictions. In Study 1, 
attention attraction effects for situational cues were found for participants that 
formed an implementation intention compared to participants that formed only 
an intention to act. The performance on one subgoal (marking critical ps) that is 
highly dependent on attention was diminished by forming an implementation 
intention for a second subgoal (marking critical ds) that was simultaneously 
pursued. 
 
Studies 2 and 3 provided even clearer evidence that situational cues 
from implementation intentions attract attention (a) by measuring attention more 
directly using a flanker task and (b) by assessing the attention attraction effect 
during the pursuit of another goal that is unrelated to the goal the 
implementation intention was formed for. Attention attraction effects of 
implementation intentions were found for cues included in an implementation 
intention but not for cues that were part of a control intention.  
 
The current findings extend those of Steller (1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 
1993) because in their studies participants in the control condition did not hold a 
goal whereas in our studies all participants had formed the goal, the 
implementation intention was based on. Goals have been shown to attract 
attention (Moskowitz, 2002). Thus, the differences between conditions in the 
studies of Steller (1992, cited in Gollwitzer, 1993) could be attributed to goals. 
However, in our studies all participants formed a goal and even an intention to 
act. Hence, the current experiments clearly demonstrate that implementation 
intentions lead to attention attraction effects for situational cues specified in 
them, supporting the assumption of Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998). Study 3 also 
provided evidence for the second aim of the present research. A positive 
relation between attention attraction effects and performance has been 
demonstrated. The more attention a situational cue attracts, the better 
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performance is during goal pursuit. Even though there was only weak evidence 
for this in the current study, one might speculate that the attention attraction 
effects from implementation intentions lead to an increase in performance, 
because when situational cues attract attention this lowers the risk that good 
opportunities to act are missed. Further research might seek more evidence for 
this process assumed by Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998). 
 
Due to the automaticity of the attention attraction effects they are very 
hard to control. Therefore, the attraction of attention through implementation 
intentions could lead to costs, because other important cues are prevented from 
getting enough attention and the pursuit of competing important goals suffers. 
The current research provided initial evidence for this downside of 
implementation intentions. The subgoal to mark critical ps as well as the 
response speed in the flanker task during distractor trials suffered from the 
implementation intention. Therefore, care should be taken to form 
implementation intentions that include situational cues occurring in other 
contexts than in the one where the goal furnished with the implementation 
intentions is meant to be pursued. Otherwise the attainment of other goals 
might suffer. Taking into account that implementation intentions are always 
bound to self set goals that can be actualized and that the formation of 
implementation intentions needs a conscious mental act (Gollwitzer, 1999), 
inadequate attentional attraction effects should not outweigh the benefits of 
implementation intention for goal pursuit. 
 
As an example for the intended as well as unintended implementation 
intention effects, one could intend to call back one’s grandma. To improve the 
attainment of this goal an implementation intention ‘If I see a telephone, I will 
call back my grandma.’ can be formed. This is a simple act that can be done 
even shortly before an important business meeting. But it could be that during 
the meeting, one will find oneself glimpsing at a telephone behind the 
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conversation partner, even if one tries to hold eye contact. However, once the 
meeting is over, the implementation intention will ensure that the telephone will 
not escape one’s attention and the grandma will be called.
    69 
 
5 IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL 
SIDE EFFECTS 
Whereas the first three studies examined side effects of implementation 
intentions in form of attention attraction effects, Study 4 and 5 invested if 
implementation intentions lead to unintended behaviors. More precisely, the 
consequences of implementation intentions for evaluative behaviors in social 
contexts were examined. Social judgments have been chosen as an application 
area of implementation intentions because most often judgments of a group are 
not made in complete isolation, but against the interpretative background of 
other groups (Tajfel, 1981, Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Judgments of one group 
have been found to be interrelated to the judgments of other groups. 
Interferences of such interrelations between social groups can disturb social 
relations between groups and even lead to harmful social conflicts. Therefore, it 
is of high importance to examine the potential consequences of volitional 
strategies on behavior in social contexts. In the following, I will focus on 
consequences of implementation intentions in contexts with more than one 
social group. It will be argued that the specification of behavior directed at one 
specific social group within an implementation intention impacts on behavior 
directed at different social groups. Depending on the relation between the 
respective groups, discrete pattern of the implementation intention impact on 
the behavior directed at a different group are expected. The automaticity of the 
implementation intention effects is discussed as the mechanism underlying the 
predicted impact of implementation intention on judgments of social groups.
5.1 The automaticity of implementation intentions 
Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998, p. 124) assume that implementation 
intentions operate as a “strategic automaticity when a conscious act of will 
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delegates the control of one’s actions to anticipated inner or external events.” In 
other words: by forming an implementation intention a link between the 
specified situation and the goal-directed behavior is established. Based on this 
link the goal-directed behavior is automatically initiated when the critical 
situation is encountered. “This automaticity should be rooted in particularly 
effective memory retrieval processes in situ as a result of having mentally linked 
selected suitable situations and effective goal-directed behaviors ahead of time” 
(Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 495). Evidence supports the assumption that 
implementation intentions lead to automatic action initiation (Bayer, Moskowitz, 
& Gollwitzer, 2002, cited in Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Brandstätter et al., 2001; 
Webb & Sheeran, 2004).  
 
Even though this automaticity has without any doubt advantages for the 
pursuit of goals, it might also, as most other automatic effects, have 
disadvantages: just as heuristics most of the time are functional but in some 
cases lead to errors (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and stereotypes are 
sometimes useful (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994) but they also lead to 
unjustified prejudice (Devine, 1989), implementation intentions might lead to the 
automatic initiation of the specified behavior in a moment, when it does not lead 
to goal attainment but has unintended effects. Such overgeneralization will be 
studied in the current article in the field of judgments of social groups. 
5.2 Generalization effects of the automaticity of 
implementation intentions 
Overgeneralization of implementation intentions is defined as the 
automatic initiation of behavior specified in implementation intentions by 
situational cues of implementation intentions, when this behavior cannot serve 
the goal the implementation intention was formed for. Given that the behavior 
specified in the implementation intention is applicable in the pursuit of another 
5 Implementation intentions and behavioral side effects   71 
 
goal, the resulting behavior should be biased in the direction of the behavior 
specified in the implementation intention as overgeneralization (e.g., modifying 
the judgment of one target while the implementation intention was formed for 
another target). 
 
Why should such effects occur? Numerous studies on automatic 
behavior demonstrated that priming a cue leads unintentionally to associated 
behavior (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; for a review, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 
2001). If implementation intentions indeed operate based on automaticity, 
similar effects should result from the cues specified in the implementation 
intention. When these situational cues are present the behavior associated to 
them via an implementation intention will occur, no matter whether the goal 
underlying the implementation intention can be pursued or not. 
 
Research on automatic behavior did not only demonstrate that cues can 
elicit concordant behavior but also, under certain conditions, priming a cue may 
lead to contrast effects (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Dijksterhuis, Spears, & 
Lépinasse, 2001; Schubert & Häfner, 2003; Spears, Gordijn, Dijksterhuis, & 
Stapel, 2004). That is, if a social comparison between the self and the prime 
was unconsciously provoked, people unintentionally acted opposite to what a 
situational cue suggested. Social comparisons can be provoked by priming 
single exemplars or a stereotype. For example, categorizing perceived others 
(e.g., elderly) as part of the vis à vis outgroup or subliminally priming the self 
during the activation of a stereotype, the self does not belong to (e.g., hussy), 
does both lead to automatic behavioral contrast from the stereotype (faster 
instead of slower reactions in a lexical decision task after priming the elderly; 
more instead of less correct answers in a knowledge task after priming hussy, 
Schubert & Häfner, 2003). 
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Based on these findings, it was predicted not overgeneralization but 
automatic contrast effects from implementation intentions, when situational 
cues of an implementation intention are present and at the same time social 
comparisons take place. As a consequence, the behavior should be endorsed 
in the opposite direction of the behavior included in the implementation 
intention. This is, for example, the case when a cue from an ingroup-related 
implementation intention occurs, while the behavior is directed towards an 
outgroup.  
 
Taken together, side effects of implementation intentions in form of 
automatic overgeneralization (i.e., behavior as specified in the implementation 
intention) are expected when implementation intention cues are presented 
during the pursuit of another goal and no social comparison is provoked. 
Contrast effects (i.e., opposite behavior as specified in the implementation 
intention) are expected when the respective cues are present and a social 
comparison is provoked at the same time. More specifically, it was predicted 
that forming an implementation intention to positively judge a group will also 
improve the judgment of a group not included in this intention when the 
situational cue included in the implementation intention is present during the 
judgment of the other group. This effect will only occur when both groups are 
outgroups (i.e., no social comparison will be provoked). Furthermore, it was 
predicted that an implementation intention to judge an ingroup positively leads 
to contrast effects in the judgment of an outgroup (i.e., more negative judgment) 
in the presence of ingroup cues, because social comparisons will take place. 
Beside both overgeneralization effects, it was predicted that the groups the 
implementation intentions have been formed for are more positively judged.  
Overview of the studies on behavioral side effects of implementation intentions 
The present research examined whether group-directed implementation 
intentions beside an improved attainment of their respective goal led to side 
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effects in the form of automatic behavioral overgeneralization and contrast 
effects. To measure these effects, cues from group-directed implementation 
intentions were present during the judgment of different groups. Implementation 
intentions related to group judgments were expected to not only lead to the 
intended endorsed group judgments but in addition to unintentionally biased 
outgroup judgments if cues of the implementation intention are present. 
 
To test these predictions two experiments were conducted in which 
intentions were varied between participants. Participants furnished a goal 
intention either with an implementation intention or a control intention. In Study 
1, the participant’s goal was to judge a specific outgroup positively, that was 
treated unfairly in the judgment task, whereas in Study 2 it was their goal to 
improve ingroup judgments. Study 1 was conducted to examine the 
overgeneralization from implementation intention effects from judgments of one 
outgroup to judgments of a different outgroup. In Study 2 it was tested, if the 
inclusion of the social self in the implementation intention led to contrasting 
overgeneralization effects from the judgment of the ingroup to the judgment of 
an outgroup. 
5.3 Study 4 
In Study 4, participants were categorized as members of a social group. 
Their task was to judge the quality of ideas generated by two outgroups. 
Intentions to support one of the two groups were formed, because this group 
was treated unfairly by earlier judges. Participants furnished a goal intention 
either with an implementation intention or a control intention. The judgments 
had to be made in the presence of cues that indicated the group whose ideas 
had to be judged subsequently. By varying these cues, the judgment of one 
outgroup had in some cases to be made in the presence of the other. This 
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design served to measure the overgeneralization of implementation intention 
effects to the judgment of an implementation intention unrelated group.  
 
For the judgment of the ideas of the outgroup that was included in the 
implementation intention, more favorable judgments in the implementation 
intention condition compared to the control intention condition were predicted 
no matter which group had to be judged next. For the judgment of the ideas of 
the outgroup that was not included in the implementation intention, more 
favorable judgments in the implementation intention condition compared to the 
control intention condition were predicted if the situational cue of the 
implementation intention (i.e., the group the implementation intention was 
formed for) was present in the background. No differences were expected 
between conditions if cues of the implementation intention unrelated outgroup 
were present in the background of the implementation intention unrelated 
outgroup judgment. 
5.3.1 Method 
Design and Participants 
Study 4 had a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 design with Intention (implementation 
intention vs. control intention) as a between-subjects factor and Group (red / 
intention outgroup vs. blue / control outgroup) and Background (same group 
present in the background vs. other group present in the background) as within-
subjects factors. Thirty-seven female and 23 male undergraduate students of 
the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena with a mean age of 22 years (Range 18-
28) took part in the experiment in the exchange for 5 €. 
Procedure 
On average, six participants (range: 3-8) attended per session at 
separate computers. They were told that they would work on a computer-based 
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Study on marketing techniques. First, they were ostensibly randomly assigned 
to one of six different teams to introduce a social categorization. All participants 
were assigned to the green team. Then, they were requested to generate new 
names for products. It was stated that each of the teams will get an additional 
100€ if their product names were judged more positive than a given criterion to 
increase motivation and also to ensure that no negative interdependence 
between groups was perceived. After the generation of product names as part 
of the cover story, participants were told that they would have to judge product 
names members of the different teams generated earlier. In a second random 
assignment procedure it was ostensibly determined, which teams had to be 
judged. In fact, all participants had to judge the red and the blue team. 
Participants worked on a training for this task before the task started, which was 
in fact the intention manipulation.  
 
To motivate the so-called training they were shown a bogus overview of 
the previous judgments of the six teams. The red team got the worst judgment 
by co-participants but not by experts and the blue team was almost equally 
judged by both groups. It was stated that the judgment of the product names of 
the red team was unfair and that the upcoming training aimed to correct this 
bias by training swift and fair judgments. Thus, participants in both conditions 
formed goal intentions to judge product names depending on their fit to actual 
products and to judge the ideas fairly. Next, depending on the experimental 
condition an implementation intention (“If I judge product names of the red 
team, I choose the highest adequate amount of points”) or a control intention (“I 
choose the highest adequate amount of points for the red team”) was formed in 
for the judgment of the red team but not for the judgment of the blue team. 
Participants read the intention, rehearsed it three times and wrote it down on 
the next page of the manipulation sheet. Besides these different intentions, both 
experimental conditions were completely identical. 
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Next, participants judged the quality of different names for the same 
products they generated names for before. These names had seemingly 
generated by the members of the red and the blue team. The product names 
consisted of two sets of names that were randomly assigned to the two teams. 
After completing the product name judgment, participants worked through a 
final questionnaire, were debriefed and thanked. 
Measures 
Judgments: Participants judged product names from the red team 
(OGred) and from the blue team (OGblue) on a 13-point scale. Higher numbers 
indicated better judgments. The factor background was varied within the 
judgment task. The group membership of the persons, whose product names 
had to be judged, was indicated by the text and by the color of the frame 
around the judgment scale and the window. In the background of the actual 
judgment, participants partly saw the window of the next judgment task (similar 
to the cascade function in most operation systems and software). Participants 
were told that the team of the following judgment is present in the background 
of the actual judgment as additional information for their convenience. Thus, 
cues of two groups were present on the screen during the judgment: the one 
the current idea stems from and the one the following idea stems from. By this 
feature the factor background was operationalized. For each judgment 
participants had 30 seconds. Number of missing answers in the critical 24 
judgments (Mimplementation intention (ii) = 0.10, SDii = 0.55; Mcontrol intention (ci) = 0.10, 
SDci = 0.40, overall 0.42 percent) and reaction times (Mii = 5.70 s, SDii = 1.04; 
Mci = 5.54 s, SDci = 1.30) did not differ between conditions, F < 1. These figures 
indicate that participants in both conditions had no problem to make their 
judgment in the given time. The first judgment served as a practice trial, the last 
judgment consisted of only one group, without a second group in the 
background, to fit the cover story. These two judgments were not included in 
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the analysis. The mean number of points was computed separately for the two 
groups and the two backgrounds, resulting in four group-background 
combinations (OGred - OGred, OGred - OGblue, OGblue - OGblue, OGblue - OGred). 
Each of these combinations contained 6 trials.  
 
Questionnaire: In the final questionnaire participant’s identification with 
the green team was measured on a three-item scale (“I identify with my team”, 
“I am glad to belong to the green team”, “I see myself as an important member 
of the green team”, α = .84). In addition, the questionnaire included separate 
control items related to the manipulation (“How helpful was the intention for the 
judgment of the created product names?”, “Did the intention lead you to pay 
less attention to the product names of the other team?”), to the perceived 
performance in the product generation task (“The product names I created were 
of high quality”) and to the strategy used (“I tried to treat both teams as equal as 
possible”). All items responded to on 7-point scales. 
5.3.2 Results 
The judgments of the group the implementation intention was formed for 
(OGred) were predicted to be better in the implementation intention condition 
compared to the control intention condition. Judgments of the implementation 
intention unrelated outgroup (OGblue) were predicted to be better in the 
implementation intention condition compared to the control intention condition, 
only when the cue of the OGred was in the background, but not when the cue of 
the OGblue was in the background. To test this prediction, a mixed MANOVA 
was computed with Group and Background as within-subjects factors, Intention 
as between-subjects factor and judgment of product names as the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 5: Mean distribution task judgments of Intention OGred and OGblue 
product names (in points) and standard deviations in brackets as a 
function of Intention and Background (Study 4, N = 60).  
 Intention OGred judgment OGblue judgment 
 Implementation 
intention 
Control 
intention 
Implementation 
intention 
Control 
intention 
Same group 
in background 
7.33 (1.95) 6.31 (1.98) 7.32 (2.19) 6.88 (1.99) 
Other group 
in background 
7.94 (1.89) 6.48 (2.01) 7.23 (1.88) 6.26 (1.34) 
 
A main effect of background, F (1, 58) = 4.85, p = .032, η²p = .077, a 
main effect of intention, F (1, 58) = 5.40, p = .024, η²p = .085, and a trend 
towards an Intention x Group interaction was found, F (1, 58) = 2.54, p = .116, 
η²p = .042. These effects were qualified by the expected Intention x Group x 
Background interaction, F (1, 58) = 4.53, p = .038, η²p = .072. All other Fs < 
0.29, all ps > .59, all η²p s < .005. 
 
To further explore the 3-way interaction simple comparisons based on 
the intention manipulation were computed. Product names of the OGred were as 
predicted judged more favorable in the implementation intention condition (M = 
7.64, SD = 1.81) than those in the control intention condition (M = 6.39, SD = 
1.79), F (1, 58) = 7.14, p = .010, η²p = .110. Simple comparisons were 
significant no matter which group was in the background, both Fs > 4.1, both ps 
< .05. For the implementation intention unrelated OGblue, no effect of intention 
was found in the same background condition, (Mii = 7.32, SDii = 2.19; Mci = 
6.88, SDci = 1.99), F (1, 58) = 0.64, p = .426, η²p = .011. However, product 
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names of the OGblue with a cue of OGred in the background were judged more 
positively in the implementation intention condition (M = 7.23, SD = 1.88) than 
in the control intention condition (M = 6.26, SD = 1.34), F (1, 58) = 5.32, p = 
.025, η²p = .084. In sum, the results are fully in line with our predictions. 
 
Questionnaire 
In both conditions, participants identified with their green team to the 
same extent (Mii = 4.09, SDii = 1.34; Mci = 4.21, SDci = 2.15), F (1, 58) = 0.07, p 
= .792, η²p = .001. The judgments of the self generated product names (Mii = 
3.77, SDii = 1.22; Mci = 3.53, SDci = 1.43) as well as all remaining items did not 
differ between conditions, all Fs < 0.17, ps > .697, η²p < .003. The intentions 
were perceived as equally helpful in both conditions (Mii = 3.23, SDii = 1.63; Mci 
= 3.13, SDci = 1.81), and did not influence the perceived attention that was paid 
to product names of the other team, (Mii = 2.20, SDii = 1.54; Mci = 2.17, SDci = 
1.51). Most important, the conditions did not differ in the intended strategy to 
treat both teams as equal as possible, (Mii = 4.60, SD ii = 2.16; Mci = 4.83, SDci 
= 2.18). Thus, the implementation intentions did not affect strategies, 
identification or the perceived impact of implementation intentions, even though 
they lead to a change in behavior. This suggests that the effects of 
implementation intentions operate below consciousness. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
Study 4 provides evidence for overgeneralization effects of 
implementation intentions. If situational cues from an outgroup-directed 
implementation intention were present during the judgment of another outgroup, 
they led to more favorable judgments. In addition to these overgeneralization 
effects of implementation intentions, the predicted improved performance was 
found in the form of more favorable judgments of the implementation intention 
related outgroup. The implementation intention related outgroup was judged 
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more favorable in the implementation intention condition compared to a control 
intention condition. No differences between conditions were observed 
concerning the identification, the perceived performance in the product 
generation task and the chosen strategy to treat both teams as equally as 
possible as indicated in the final questionnaire. Thus, implementation intentions 
overgeneralized to other goal pursuits (i.e., led to differential treatment) despite 
people’s explicitly assessed strategy was to treat both groups equally. 
5.4 Study 5 
To extend the evidence for the overgeneralization effects from Study 4, 
automatic behavioral contrast effects from implementation intentions should be 
shown. An implementation intention for the treatment of the ingroup should lead 
to automatic contrast in behavior towards a relevant outgroup in the presence 
of implementation intention cues.  
 
In Study 5, participants formed an implementation intention for the 
judgment of the ingroup. Accordingly, in the judgment task they had to judge 
their ingroup and an outgroup. Besides these changes, Study 5 was replicating 
Study 4. More favorable judgments of the ingroup in the implementation 
intention condition compared to the control intention condition were predicted. 
For the ideas of the outgroup that were not included in the implementation 
intention, less favorable judgments (i.e., the contrast effect) in the 
implementation intention condition compared to the control intention condition 
were predicted if ingroup cues were present in the background, but not if cues 
of the outgroup were present in the background. 
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5.4.1 Method 
Design and Participants 
A mixed 2 x 2 x 2 design with Intention (implementation intention vs. 
control intention) as between-subjects factor and Group (ingroup red vs. 
outgroup blue) and Background (same group present in background vs. other 
group present in background) as within-subjects factors was used. Thirty-nine 
female and 28 male undergraduate students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University 
Jena with a mean age of 21 years (Range 18-32) took part in the experiment in 
the exchange for 5 €. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one of Study 1 apart from the 
following alterations: Participants were assigned to the red team (instead of the 
green team).They formed an implementation intention for the judgment of the 
red team and judged product names of the red and one ostensibly randomly 
assigned other team (blue team). Hence the ingroup was included in the 
intentions and judgments. 
Manipulation  
As in Study 1, the intention manipulation was introduced as a training for 
the product name judgment task. Instead of an implementation intention to 
support an outgroup that was treated unfairly, they formed an implementation 
intention for their ingroup (i.e., red team). Because of the self-interest, no 
justification was necessary. In the implementation intention condition 
participants furnished the goal intention to judge product names with the 
implementation intention “If I judge product names of my team, I choose the 
highest adequate amount of points”, whereas in the control intention condition 
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they furnished it with an analogous control intention “I choose the highest 
adequate amount of points for my team.“ 
Measures 
Group judgments: The dependent measure was identical to the one 
used in Study 4. The two within-subjects factors were realized by ingroup vs. 
outgroup judgments and same vs. other team in the background (IGred - IGred, 
IGred - OGblue, OGblue - OGblue, OGblue - IGred). Neither the number of missing 
answers, (Mii = 0.34, SDii = 1.95; Mci = 0.06, SDci = 0.24), F (1, 65) = 0.75, p = 
.390, η²p = .011, overall 0.84 percent), nor reaction times (Mii = 5.50 s, SDii = 
1.41; Mci = 5.55 s, SDci = 1.21), differed between intention conditions, F (1, 65) 
< 1, indicating that participants in both conditions followed the instructions 
equally well. 
 
Questionnaire: In the final questionnaire, participant’s identification with 
their team was measured on the three-item scale of Study 4 (α = .86). The 
remaining items measured the perception of the manipulation, the performance 
in the product generation task, and the strategy used. 
5.4.2 Results 
Ingroup judgments were expected to be more favorable in the 
implementation intention than in the control intention condition independent of 
the background. Outgroup judgments were predicted to be less favorable in the 
implementation intention condition compared to a control intention condition 
when ingroup cues were shown in the background, but not when outgroup cues 
were shown in the background. To test these predictions, a mixed MANOVA 
was computed with Group and Background as within-subjects factors, Intention 
as between-subjects factor and judgment as dependent variable.  
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Table 6: Mean distribution task judgments of Intention Ingroup and Outgroup 
product names (in points) and standard deviations in brackets and as 
a function of Intention and Background (Study 5, N = 67). 
 Intention ingroup judgment Outgroup judgment 
 Implementation 
intention 
Control 
intention 
Implementation 
intention 
Control 
intention 
Same group 
in background 
9.17 (2.64)  8.34 (2.61)  6.04 (2.34)  6.29 (2.35) 
Other group 
in background 
9.82 (2.71)  8.36 (2.48)  5.48 (2.23)  6.58 (2.23)  
 
A strong preference for ingroup ideas (M = 8.94, SD = 2.47) over 
outgroup ideas (M = 6.08, SD = 2.11) was found, F (1, 65) = 47.06, p < .001, η²p 
= .420. This effect was qualified by an Intention by Group interaction, F (1, 65) 
= 4.89, p = .031, η²p = .070, that was again qualified by the predicted Intention x 
Group x Background interaction, F (1, 65) = 4.86, p = .031, η²p = .070. All other 
Fs < 1.98, ps> .164, η²p < .030. 
  
To explore the three-way interaction further, simple comparisons based 
on the intention manipulation were computed. As predicted, product names of 
the ingroup (M= 9.50, SD = 2.68) were judged more favorably in the 
implementation intention condition than in the control intention condition (M= 
8.35, SD = 2.55), F (1, 65) = 3.58, p = .063, η²p = .052. There was no Intention x 
Background interaction on the judgment of ingroup targets, F (1, 65) = 2.55, p = 
.116, η²p = .038. 
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For the outgroup judgments, an Intention x Background interaction was 
found, F (1, 65) = 5.18, p = .026, η²p = .074. No differences between intention 
conditions occurred for same backgrounds (Mii= 6.04, SDii = 2.34; Mci = 6.29, 
SDci = 2.35), F (1, 65) = 0.19, p = .666, η²p = .003, whereas for different 
backgrounds, significant differences in the predicted direction were found 
between conditions, F (1, 65) = 4.06, p = .048, η²p = .059. Product names of the 
outgroup with a cue of the ingroup in the background were judged less 
favorably in the implementation intention condition (Mii= 5.48, SDii = 2.23) than 
in the control condition (Mci = 6.58, SDci = 2.23). 
 
Questionnaire 
Participants in the control intention condition tended to identify more with 
their red team compared to the implementation intention condition, (Mii = 3.33, 
SDii = 1.50; Mci = 4.04, SDci = 1.72), F (1, 65) = 3.17, p = .080, η²p = .047. All 
other questionnaire measures did not differ between conditions, all other Fs < 
2.09, ps > .153, η²ps < .031 (product name judgment red team: Mii = 4.56, SDii = 
1.16, Mci = 4.71, SDci = 1.05; blue team: Mii = 4.34, SDii = 1.21; Mci = 4.17, SDci 
= 1.04; own ideas: Mii = 3.72, SDii = 1.35; Mci = 4.09, SDci = 1.50; helpfulness of 
intentions: Mii = 3.72, SDii = 1.97; Mci = 3.66, SDci = 2.01; attention paid to 
product names of the other team: Mii = 3.47, SDii = 1.88; Mci = 2.83, SDci = 
1.74). Most important, the conditions did not differ in the reported strategy. In 
both conditions, participants tried to treat the teams equally, (Mii = 4.38, SDii = 
2.09; Mci = 4.86, SDci = 2.07). Thus, implementation intentions lead participants 
to different judgments (more ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity), even 
though explicit strategies were not affected by the intentions and social 
identification was even higher in the control intention condition. 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Study 5 provides evidence for overgeneralization effects of 
implementation intentions taking the form of behavioral contrast. Beside the 
more favorable judgments of ingroup ideas in the implementation intention 
condition, the judgment of outgroup ideas showed a contrasting effect (i.e., less 
5 Implementation intentions and behavioral side effects   85 
 
favorable judgment), only if the situational cues from the ingroup-related 
implementation intention were present during the judgment. Questionnaire data 
provided no evidence that participants were aware of the impact of the 
intentions. Hence, the current data provides additional support for the automatic 
nature of effects from implementation intentions and the overgeneralization 
resulting from this. 
5.5 Discussion behavioral side effects of implementation 
intentions 
In two studies, the predicted overgeneralization effects of 
implementation intentions were found. In Study 4 the implementation intention 
to judge one outgroup positively led to positive judgments of this group and 
positive judgments of another outgroup, when the cues for the first outgroup 
were present. In Study 5 the implementation intention to judge the ingroup 
positively led to positive judgments of the ingroup and negative (i.e., 
contrasting) judgments of an unrelated outgroup, when cues for the ingroup 
were present. These findings demonstrate that the automaticity of 
implementation intentions is not restricted to situations were the goal the 
implementation intention has been formed for can be pursued. In contrast, the 
automaticity starts to work as soon as the cue it has been bound to shows up. 
Furthermore, the present findings suggest that, automaticity from 
implementation intentions can – just as other automatic behavior – either take 
the form of assimilation or of contrast effects (Schubert & Häfner, 2003). 
Overgeneralization effects of implementation intentions were elicited, when no 
social comparison takes place (Study 4) and contrast effects, when the context 
provoked social comparisons (Study 5). In addition to these side effects, 
implementation intentions improved the pursuit of the intended goal replicating 
earlier findings (for an overview, see Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Implementation 
intentions directed at social groups, with judgments as specified behaviors 
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influenced participant’s judgments in the direction of the judgments specified in 
the implementation intention. 
 
For the application of implementation intentions our findings imply that 
beside the advantages implementation intentions have for goal pursuit, they 
have under certain circumstances disadvantages. Whenever the cue of an 
implementation intention can appear in a context, where the intended behavior 
can be shown but does not contribute to the attainment of the goal the 
implementation intention has been formed for, behavioral resources are wasted 
and other behavior might become less efficient. In extreme cases unintended 
behavior can be shown. For example in our studies participants derogated an 
outgroup unintentionally. 
 
When can these side effects of implementation intentions be expected? 
With regard to attributes of the situational cue, the presence of the central part 
of the situational cue should be sufficient to elicit overgeneralization. In the 
current studies implementation intentions with cues pointing to the judgment of 
a group were formed (“If I judge product names of the red team, …”). As a 
consequence, the presence of a cue pointing to this group during the judgment 
of another group was sufficient to elicit the behavior implied by the 
implementation intention. Recent work by Webb and Sheeran (2004) has 
however shown that implementation intentions discriminate between critical and 
non-critical cues that are quite similar. The difference between their and our 
studies is that in their case the non-critical cues did not fulfill all conditions 
specified in the implementation intention whereas in our case 
overgeneralization occurred when all cues were present (the judgment and the 
group) but not in the configuration specified in the implementation intention (the 
judgment of the group). Hence, behavior specified in implementation intentions 
seems to be automatically initiated only if all critical cues are present but their 
configuration does not seem to matter. Based on the current findings this 
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conclusion certainly remains speculative and should thus be tested in further 
research. 
 
With regard to attributes of the behavior specified in the implementation 
intention, it’s applicability to the context in which the situational cue occurs will 
increase the likelihood of overgeneralization effects. In the present studies the 
behavioral dimension specified in the implementation intention was perfectly 
applicable to the group the implementation intention was not formed for. But 
even in case of no or low applicability, the presence of situational cues during 
the pursuit of another goal should at least attract attention and distract from the 
current behavior (Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006). 
 
Finally, the goal intention should matter for overgeneralization effects 
from implementation intentions. Research on the interplay of goal intentions 
and implementation intentions (e.g., Sheeran et al., 2005) demonstrated that 
implementation intention effects only occur when the associated goal is actively 
held. Accordingly, overgeneralization is only expected if this condition is 
fulfilled. However, the pursuit of most real life goals that are equipped with 
implementation intentions persists over a longer time period (e.g., exercising 
regularly, taking medication). Consequently, this precondition for 
overgeneralization effects should be fulfilled rather often, even when people 
actually pursue another goal. 
 
Taken together, the automatic initiation of behavior through a situational 
cue of an implementation intention even when it does not help the pursuit of the 
associated goal is expected if (a) the situational cues are present (not matter in 
which configuration), (b) the behavior specified in the implementation intention 
is applicable and (c) the associated goal is actively held. 
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The present research demonstrated that the automatic initiation of 
behavior by implementation intentions can be modeled by different 
environmental contexts. Depending on the social categorization (e.g., ingroup 
or outgroup), social comparisons take place and the implementation intention 
behavior overgeneralizes to a different group in form of an endorsement in the 
direction of the implementation intention or the opposite direction (i.e., contrast 
behavior). In addition, these overgeneralization effects seem to be independent 
of people’s intentional strategies. In both studies of the present research, 
judgments of an unrelated outgroup were biased by the implementation 
intention, even though in both conditions people’s intentional strategy was to 
treat all groups equally. This can be interpreted as an additional hint to the 
automaticity of the implementation intention side effects. 
 
To conclude, even though implementation intentions are formed by an 
intentional act of will, they can lead to unintentional consequences due to their 
automaticity. The same processes underlying the improved goal attainment 
through implementation intentions can under certain circumstances lead to 
disadvantages, e.g., the automatic initiation of behavior in a moment, when it is 
inadequate. These side effects of implementation intentions can take place in 
form of overgeneralization and contrast effects and are expected to occur 
despite different intentional strategies.
    89 
 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Overview of the presented studies 
Two main research questions were investigated by the present work: 
Whereas the first question aimed to inspect attentional side effects of 
implementation intentions, the second question focused on behavioral side 
effects of implementation intentions. 
 
The first research question was addressed in three studies that provide 
clear evidence that situational cues from implementation intentions attract 
people’s attention even during the pursuit of other goals. In Study 1, attention 
attraction effects of implementation intentions above and beyond those of goal 
intentions were demonstrated in an attention-concentration task. Whereas the 
implementation intention was directed at one subgoal of this task, the predicted 
diminished performance through the attraction of attention was found 
concerning a different subgoal that was pursued simultaneously. In Study 2 and 
3 attentional effects of implementation intentions were assessed in a separate 
task to avoid the direct competition of the two subgoals. As predicted, 
implementation intention cues attracted attention when their situational cues 
were present even during the pursuit of another goal.  
 
To measure the attention attraction through implementation intentions, 
different paradigms have been adapted: D2 task in Study 1 (Brickenkamp, 
1978), flanker task in Study 2 and 3 (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Despite 
changes with regard to the cues and decisions that had to be made (words and 
non-words vs. vowels and consonants) Study 2 and 3 found the predicted 
attentional side effects of implementation intentions. Thus, the present findings 
demonstrate the attraction of attention through implementation intentions in 
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different paradigms as well as with different materials and thereby point to the 
stability and robustness of these effects.  
 
Although all three studies on attention attraction effects used full 
attention paradigms (i.e., paradigms where participants had to focus their 
attention only on one task at a time) and not divided attention paradigms (i.e., 
paradigms where participants have to divide their attention between more than 
one task; e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Perretta, & Tonev, 2000), the 
demonstrated side effects of implementation intentions in full attention 
paradigms should also be valid under conditions of divided attention. As divided 
attention paradigms demand more of the limited attentional resources than full 
attention paradigms, it would be expected that in divided attention paradigms 
yet stronger attraction of attention and thus stronger attentional side effects of 
implementation intentions occur. Nevertheless, divided attention paradigms 
provide a suitable method to further investigate attention attraction effects, as 
they allow examining a potential moderation of the attention attraction effects by 
modality. For example, visual cues of an implementation intention could have a 
different impact on the residual attentional capacity for other visual cues than 
for auditory cues. 
 
Taken together, the present findings fully support the assumption of 
attentional side effects of implementation intentions. It has been demonstrated 
that depending on the context (i.e., the goal that is actually pursued) automatic 
attentional processes can promote goal attainment (i.e., performance 
improvement) but can also interfere with successful goal pursuit (i.e., attention 
attraction when it is not helpful for goal attainment). Thereby, the results of the 
mediation analysis in Study 3 suggest that the impact of the implementation 
intention on the performance resulted from the attraction of attention through 
their situational cues. Whereas the performance improvement findings replicate 
previous research results, the attention attraction effects of implementation 
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intentions (above and beyond goal intentions even during the pursuit of another 
goal) are the first that provide evidence of attentional side effects and thus 
costs of the automaticity of implementation intentions in terms of attention.  
 
The second research question was addressed in two studies in the 
context of social groups. It was examined, if implementation intentions impact 
on behavior even during the pursuit of other goals. Evidence for such automatic 
behavior effects of implementation intentions have been demonstrated in form 
of overgeneralization (Study 4) as well as contrast effects (Study 5). In addition, 
performance improvement through implementation intentions has been shown 
in both studies. In both studies (Study 4, 5), groups were judged on identical 
13-point Likert scales. As predicted, overgeneralization effects of an 
implementation intention to judge one outgroup positively were found in form of 
positive judgments of another outgroup, if and only if the cues for the 
implementation intention outgroup were present (Study 4). Moreover, in line 
with our hypotheses, contrast effects of an implementation intention to judge 
the ingroup positively were found in form of negative judgments of an unrelated 
outgroup, only if cues for the ingroup were present (Study 5). 
 
Even though in the cover story great effort was spent to ensure that 
participants do not perceive the groups as interdependent (see section 5.1.1), 
the present studies do not allow to completely exclude the possibility that the 
identical rating scales led to the perception of interdependence between the 
group judgments. If such an interdependence would have been perceived in 
terms of the ability of an outgroup to influence one’s groups outcomes (i.e., high 
level of perceived interdependence between groups), this could have led to 
improved outgroup judgments as a form of outgroup favoritism (derived from 
studies on the minimal group paradigm; e.g., Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). 
On the other hand, if such an interdependence would have been perceived in 
form of zero-sum beliefs (i.e., high level of perceived negative interdependence 
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between groups), an accentuation of the group differences would be predicted 
by theories on intergroup relations (for a summary, see Brewer & Brown, 1998). 
However, as both intention conditions used the same rating scales, such a 
perceived interdependence would not explain the behavioral side effects of 
implementation intentions because the critical behavior only occurred when the 
cue appeared in the background. But to extend the present results, future 
research could measure performance improvement and automatic 
overgeneralization of implementation intentions on different dependent 
measures to avoid any perception of interdependence between the groups. 
Moreover, the cover story (e.g., different contexts and goals for each group) 
could be changed. Similarly to findings of studies on automatic behavior (e.g., 
Bargh et al., 1996; Epley & Gilovich, 1999; Macrae & Johnston, 1998), it would 
be expected that implementation intentions still lead to side effects in form of 
overgeneralizing as well as contrasting behavior even when the framing or the 
scales is changed. Thereby, the applicability of the behavior specified in the 
implementation intention is assumed to act as boundary condition of these side 
effects. Only when the specified behavior can still be applied to a different 
judgment scale, behavioral side effects should occur. To test these 
assumptions, future research should further explore the role of the perceived 
interdependence between groups as well as the limits of the applicability of the 
behaviors, specified in an implementation intention, in different contexts. 
 
Taken together, also the second empirical part of this thesis provides 
good evidence for side effects of implementation intentions. It has been 
demonstrated that implementation intentions depending on the context can 
promote goal attainment (i.e., performance improvement) but, as predicted, can 
also interfere with successful goal pursuit as a behavioral side effect. 
Furthermore, these side effects of the automatic initiation of behavior by 
implementation intentions can be modeled by environmental contexts. 
Depending on the occurrence of social comparisons, implementation intentions 
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can lead to overgeneralization or contrast behavior even during the pursuit of 
another goal. Without social comparisons, overgeneralization of implementation 
intention behavior to the pursuit of another goal was shown. With social 
comparisons, contrast behavior was shown during the pursuit of another goal. 
Whereas the performance improvement findings replicate previous research 
results, the demonstrated overgeneralization and contrast behaviors are the 
first demonstrations of costs of implementation intention in form of behavioral 
side effects. 
 
These attentional and behavioral side effects of implementation 
intentions are especially important as the present research provided first 
evidence that people are not aware of them and thus do not consciously 
regulate their behavior in order to prevent such potential side effects. In the 
studies on the attentional side effects of implementation intentions, people 
reported that they perceived no distraction during a decision task, even though 
their reaction times in fact slowed down when situational cues of an 
implementation intention were present as distractor. Even more dramatic 
consequences of such lack of awareness and correction processes of the 
automatic implementation intention effects have been demonstrated in the 
second series of studies. Social discrimination in form of unjustified bad 
judgments of a social group was found even though people’s explicitly stated 
strategy was to treat all groups equally fair. Further support for such a lack of 
awareness and correction processes was provided by Schaal (1993; cited in 
Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998), who’s findings suggest that people cannot easily 
disengage from an ineffective implementation intention during a concentration 
achievement task. Hence, forming implementation intentions involves the risk of 
recurring unintended side effects and suboptimal performances because people 
are not aware of what they are doing and thus cannot consciously correct it. 
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As a final point, two special features of the manipulation used in the 
present studies should be pointed out. First, to my knowledge, the present 
research is the first that included more than one implementation intention in the 
manipulation. This is especially noteworthy as the number of implementation 
intentions formed for a goal pursuit can be assumed to moderate their 
effectiveness. If more implementation intentions are formed for one goal 
pursuit, the strength of the situation-behavior link as well as the expected 
accessibility of each of the situational cues and thereby their effectiveness 
should be reduced. Consequently, attentional and behavioral side effects 
should be even stronger if only one implementation intention is formed. 
Moreover, previous findings of performance improvement through 
implementation intentions can be expected to be weaker if more than one 
implementation intention would have been formed. Although more research is 
needed to comprehensively examine the moderation of the implementation 
intention effects by their number, the present thesis provides good evidence for 
their effectiveness even when more than one implementation intention is 
formed for a goal pursuit.  
 
Second, in the present thesis a new type of control condition was 
employed. Different from the pure familiarization with the situational cues (e.g., 
Brandstätter et al., 2001) or the formation of irrelevant implementation 
intentions (e.g., Webb & Sheeran, 2003), control intentions were used that 
avoided different amounts of information between conditions. That is, only the 
format (i.e., if-then format), but not the arguments (e.g., red team, judge, 
product name) included an implementation intention differed between 
conditions. Thereby, the present research is the first that allows excluding 
different amounts of information between the intention conditions as alternative 
explanations of the demonstrated implementation intention effects. 
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6.2 Implications and outlook 
6.2.1 Implications for information processing 
Implementation intentions promote the pursuit of intended goals 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2005), but they can also lead to side effects concerning 
people’s attention as well as their behavior. More generally, side effects of 
implementation intentions, similarly to other processes of self-regulation, are 
assumed to impact on each of the stages of the information processing 
sequence. As attentional side effects take place at the beginning of this 
sequence, all following processes (i.e., encoding, memorizing, modeling, 
retrieving an information and the resulting decisions, judgments, new 
representations or behaviors) can also be expected to be influenced by these 
side effects. For example attentional side effects of implementation intentions 
could impact on memory. In a study of Chasteen et al. (2001), elderly persons 
formed an implementation intention to write the day of the week in the upper 
right corner of every sheet in a performance test. It could be speculated that if 
these elderly persons would have worked on an additional task that does not 
demand writing the day of the week in the upper right corner of every sheet 
(e.g., paper-based memory task), they should have been more likely to be 
distracted from the actual memory task because their attention would have 
been attracted by the upper right corner of the sheet. That even such small 
distractions can actually impede memory has been demonstrated by recent 
research on prospective memory (e.g., Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, & 
Dismukes, 2003). Thus, it can be expected that the attraction of attention 
through situational cues of an implementation intention can lead to forgetting of 
other relevant information and thereby seriously impede memory processes 
and goal attainment as an attentional side effect of implementation intentions. 
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Moreover, also behavioral side effects of implementation intentions can 
be assumed to impact on other components of information processing (e.g., 
other decisions, new representations or behaviors) than on judgments (see 
Study 4 and 5). Using the example of Chasteen et al. (2001) again, it could be 
speculated that if the elderly persons would have worked on an additional task 
that does not demand writing the day of the week in the upper right corner of 
every sheet (e.g., paper-based concentration task), they should have been 
more likely to experience interferences initiating a behavior demanded in the 
additional task. They could even falsely initiate the behavior (i.e., writing down 
the day of the week) in such an unrelated paper based concentration task 
because the situational cues lead to the automatic action initiation. Hence, the 
potential of attentional and behavioral side effects of implementation intentions 
to bias information processing and thereby seriously impede successful goal 
attainment points to the importance to further examine the processing of 
information with respect to such automatic motivational influences. 
6.2.2 Implications for intergroup research 
In Study 5 of the present thesis, ingroup-directed implementation 
intentions have been demonstrated to lead to social discrimination of an 
unrelated outgroup as a behavioral side effect. This implies that it is not 
necessary to be motivated to derogate an outgroup but that volitional strategies 
directed at the ingroup can result in social discrimination. Thus, implementation 
intentions (i.e., the automatic initiation of behavior opposite to the one specified 
in the implementation intention during an outgroup judgment) can lead to a 
reciprocal relation between ingroup and outgroup-directed behavior. These 
effects are especially important as in most of the research on social 
discrimination, variations of ingroup positivity and social identification did not 
systematically correlate with outgroup negativity (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 
1989). Or if such a relation was found (e.g., ingroup bias in the minimal group 
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paradigm; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) it has easily been eliminated 
(i.e., by changing the valence of the allocated resources from positive to 
negative outcomes; Mummendey et al., 1992) demonstrating that solely 
categorization processes are not enough to elicit outgroup negativity. 
Consequently, the necessity to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup 
attitudes as well as behavior has been pointed out by recent research on 
prejudice (e.g., the separate treatment of ingroup love and outgroup hate; 
Brewer, 1999; the separate treatment of ingroup and outgroup attitudes in 
implicit measures of prejudice; Sassenberg & Wieber, 2005). Although this 
separate treatment without doubt is useful most of the time, the present findings 
demonstrate that a reciprocal relation between ingroup and outgroup behavior 
(e.g., outgroup negativity, Study 5) can be caused by volitional mechanisms 
linked to the ingroup. Similarly to such automatic effects of volition, it could be 
expected that also intentional processes could result in a shift from solely 
ingroup favoritism to outgroup negativity under certain circumstances (e.g., 
when painful constraints are experienced as ingroup member). More generally, 
the demonstrated social discrimination, as side effect of an intentional planned 
volitional strategy (i.e., implementation intentions), points to the importance of 
further investigating the consequences of automatic as well as intentional 
volitional processes for intergroup behavior. Thereby, the demonstrated side 
effects especially call for the examination of the potential of goal striving (i.e., 
volitional) processes to lead to harmful consequences in the context of 
intergroup relations (e.g., social discrimination). 
 
Besides costs through behavioral side effects of implementation 
intentions, also attentional side effects are expected to have costs in intergroup 
situations. The attraction of attention through (ingroup-related) situational cues 
of an implementation intention should impair the attention to outgroup-related 
information and thereby the whole social information processing sequence (see 
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6.2.1). Thus, although attentional and behavioral side effect of implementation 
intentions do not necessarily lead to harmful consequences in the context of 
social groups (e.g., outgroup favoritism as behavioral side effect in Study 4) 
their automaticity and the lack of control do not allow to exclude the possibility 
of potential harmful consequences.  
6.2.3 Implications for the Rubicon model of action phases 
What do these findings imply for the Rubicon model of action phases 
that served as main theoretical framework for the present thesis? First, the 
demonstrated impact of implementation intentions on the pursuit of different 
goals suggests that simultaneously pursued background goals can interfere 
with successful focal goal achievement. Therefore, it would be useful to extend 
the Rubicon model of action phases to allow modeling more than one goal 
pursuit at a time (e.g., Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004; Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). Predictions about potential interactions between different 
goal intentions as well as between implementation intentions and other goal 
intentions could be derived and potential costs of intentions for the pursuit of 
other goals could be examined more systematically.  
 
Second, the Rubicon model of action phases should be extended to 
allow elaborating more on automatic processes, their role during goal pursuit 
and their interplay with conscious processes during goal pursuit. Such 
extensions seem especially valuable, as recent theories (e.g., auto-motive 
theory, Bargh, 1990) and research on unconscious goal pursuit (e.g., Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) point to the significance of 
automatic processes for goal pursuit. The present research suggests that it is 
an useful approach to combine the Rubicon model of action phases with recent 
theories on motivation (e.g., goal system theory, Kruglanski et al., 2002; auto 
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motive theory, Bargh, 1990) to allow exploring potential side effects of 
implementation intentions for the pursuit of other goals (see 6.2.4).  
6.2.4 Outlook 
Given the severe consequences of side effects of implementation 
intentions and the seemingly missing ability of people to regulate these effects, 
it remains an important task for future research to find ways to further examine 
and to prevent such side effects. With regard to the formation of implementation 
intentions, it could be speculated that concrete implementation intentions 
should at least reduce the likelihood that these cues occur during the pursuit of 
another goal and thus the likelihood of side effects of implementation intentions. 
As an additional advantage, such concretely formed implementation intentions 
should, similarly to concretely formed goal intentions, be more effective than 
abstract ones (Locke & Latham, 1990). For example, more than one situational 
cue could be included into the specification of the anticipated situation (e.g., 
When I turn the page in a psychological test…). However, as demonstrated in 
Study 4 and 5 of the present thesis, even the inclusion of more than one 
situational cue did not prevent behavioral side effects of implementation 
intentions. The presence of the situational cues (product name, red team) was 
sufficient to elicit the automatic action initiation, even when a different group 
(i.e., blue team) had to be judged. Thus, although the presence of both 
situational cues was necessary for the automatic action initiation (i.e., it did not 
take place when only one of the two specified situational cues was present: 
product name, but not red team), the configuration of the situational cues did 
not seem to matter (see also section 5.3). Hence, specifying more than one 
situational cue will most likely reduce the likelihood of behavioral side effects of 
implementation intentions, but as their configuration is not taken into account, 
they are still possible. Similarly, the concrete formulation of behaviors in an 
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implementation intention should only reduce the likelihood of behavioral side 
effects without completely preventing them. 
 
Besides these suggested venues for future research on the formation of 
plans, the goal-dependent automaticity of implementation intentions should be 
further investigated to get a better understanding of side effects of 
implementation intentions and ways to prevent them. With regard to the 
interplay between superordinate goal intentions and implementation intentions, 
implementation intentions are supposed to lead to the automatic initiation of the 
specified behavior only when a goal intention is actively held (Sheeran et al. 
2005). Up to date, this moderation has only been examined with activated or 
non-activated goals, but not with completed goals or goals people disengaged 
from. Even though it has been argued that the effects of implementation 
intentions should disappear as soon as the associated goal is completed or a 
disengagement from the goal took place (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998), it has not 
been systematically examined if implementation intention effects are moderated 
by these states of the superordinate goal intention. Hence, further research on 
unintended side effects of implementation intentions is needed to decide, if they 
still enfold their effects when the superordinate goal intention has been 
completed or a disengagement from it took place. Potential side effects of 
implementation intentions could only be prevented when implementation 
intentions are simultaneously synchronized with their superordinate goal 
intentions.  
 
Moreover, future research could investigate the robustness of the 
demonstrated side effects by extending the time period between the formation 
of an implementation intention and the measurement of their side effects. In the 
present research, the superordinate goal of the implementation intention was 
formed directly before the measurement of their side effects and the 
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performance improvement. Thus, it could be assumed that the demonstrated 
results are restricted to contexts with short time periods between the formation 
of an implementation intention and the side effect measurement. However, as 
performance improvement effects of implementation intentions have been 
repeatedly demonstrated in contexts with expanded temporal distances (e.g., 
Brandstätter, Heimbeck, Malzacher, & Frese, 2003; Orbell & Sheeran, 2000; 
Sheeran & Orbell, 1999), a replication of the present side effects would be 
expected even under an increased temporal distance. In addition, the 
demonstrated positive relation between performance improvement and 
attentional side effects of implementation intentions (Study 3) implies that the 
findings on the robustness of the performance improvement effects can also be 
transferred to attentional and behavioral side effects. 
 
Finally, consequences of implementation intentions for alternative means 
should be examined. Similarly to potential interferences on the level of goals 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), also interferences between means could be expected 
as a side effect of implementation intentions. Like habits, implementation 
intentions establish a relation between a goal and a specific mean (i.e., 
behavior that leads to goal attainment and is elicited by specified situational 
cues). Recent research on habit formation (Danner, Aarts, Bender, & de Vries, 
2005) revealed that the repeated use of a specific mean led to the inhibition of 
alternative means. As implementation intentions establish a situation-behavior 
link for a specific goal, it could be expected that alternative means (i.e., 
behaviors that are not specified in an implementation intention) are inhibited as 
a consequence. This could result in ineffective choices of means. For example, 
if situational cues are present during the pursuit of other goals they could lead 
to an inhibition of means that would be adequate for the pursuit of the other 
goal that is actually pursued. Thus, future research should further investigate 
6 General Discussion   102 
 
side effects that result from the inhibition of alternative means that are not 
specified in an implementation intention. 
6.3 Conclusions  
When implementation intentions have automatic consequences they, as 
every automaticity, should lead to side effects as a downside under certain 
circumstances. The arguments and findings presented in this thesis allow the 
conclusion that implementation intentions can lead to unintended side effects. 
Such side effects have been demonstrated in form of costs of the automatic 
attraction of attention and of the generalization of the automatic initiation of 
behavior to situations where it did not serve goal attainment (i.e., during the 
pursuit of another goal than the one the implementation intention has been 
formed for). Furthermore, it has been shown that the behavioral side effects of 
implementation intentions can be modeled by environmental contexts. When 
social comparisons were provoked, behavior opposite to the one specified in 
the ingroup-directed implementation intention was initiated towards an 
outgroup. In addition, also performance improvements through implementation 
intentions were demonstrated in detection tasks as well as in judgments of 
social groups. Thus, the same processes (i.e., attraction of attention through 
situational cues, automatic initiation of behavior) that can promote the 
attainment of a goal can also hinder the successful pursuit of another goal. 
These results are a further step towards a comprehensive understanding of the 
benefits as well as the costs, the automatic processes of the self-regulatory 
metacognitive tool of implementation intentions have for goal pursuit. 
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APPENDIX 
 
German sentences used in Study 3 in the letter detection task containing the 
letters D/d. All D/d letters are underlined. Difficult detectable d letters are 
additionally written in italic letters. 
In vielen Gegenden südlich der Alpen ist das Wetter meist sehr schön. 
Das schöne Dorf im bayerischen Wald zog im Sommer viele Besucher an. 
Für alle Studenten ist es unerlässlich, dass prinzipiell der Text zum Referat intensiv 
gelesen werden muss. 
Fast auf der ganzen Welt ist ein Deo Teil der modernen Kosmetik. 
Oft wechselt das Wetter auch mehrmals am gleichen Tag. 
Für die Kunstwissenschaft ist es wichtig, dass ein Dia einen möglichst authentischen 
Eindruck eines Kunstwerks vermittelt. 
Vor allem für Haushalte von Berufstätigen ist die Anstellung einer Putzfrau 
unvermeidlich. 
Bei armen Leuten wird ein Dach mit Stroh gedeckt. 
Weder Fleisch noch Fisch, sondern eine gesunde Lebensweise mit Gemüse ist die 
Alternative für Vegetarier. 
Nicht nur für Betende, sondern auch für Kunstinteressierte ist ein alter Dom interessant 
und besuchenswert. 
Westlich der Stadt München liegen die Orte Stuttgart und Ulm nahe beieinander. 
Ein gutes Dia ist meist farbstärker als ein Negativ. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Psychologists agree that goals are central to human functioning (e.g., 
Locke & Latham, 1990). Which goals one intends to achieve is defined by goal 
intentions (“I intend to achieve goal Z!”). They translate noncommittal desires 
into binding goals. But the distance between goal setting and goal attainment is 
often long (Gollwitzer, 1999). To improve goal attainment, implementation 
intentions can be formed that specify when, where, and how one intends to 
pursue a goal (“If situation X is encountered, I will perform behavior Y!”). Thus, 
implementation intentions are special plans, subordinate to goal intentions, 
which allow people to delegate the initiation of goal-directed behavior to 
environmental stimuli and thereby improve goal attainment. The goal of this 
thesis is to examine not only the benefits but particularly potential costs of 
implementation intentions. 
 
Previous findings demonstrate that implementation intentions, even 
though they are formed through an intentional act of will, have automatic effects 
(for an overview, see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). They lead to an improved 
detection of the critical situation X (e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999) 
and to the automatic initiation of the specified actions Y as soon as the 
specified situation X arises (e.g., Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001). 
However, up to date no research has considered possible unintended side 
effects of the automaticity of implementation intentions, when situational cues of 
an implementation intention are present during the pursuit of another goal than 
goal Z. In two main research questions such unintended side effects were 
addressed. Whereas the first research question examined if implementation 
intentions bias attention as unintended side effects, the second research 
question examined if they bias behavior as unintended side effects. 
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Attentional side effects of implementation intentions were expected when 
situational cues included in an implementation intention show up in an 
unrelated task. It was tested that, as our attentional resources are limited, the 
attraction of attention through implementation intentions leads to costs in terms 
of diminished attention to other relevant cues. Three studies found support for 
this hypothesis. Attention attraction effects were shown in contexts with more 
than one important task dimension (Study 1) and in separate measurement in 
unrelated tasks (Study 2 and 3). Additionally, a positive relation between 
attention attraction effects and improved performance effects was 
demonstrated (Study 3). More attentional attraction co-occurred with improved 
performances through implementation intentions in a separate task. 
 
Behavioral side effects of implementation intentions were expected when 
situational cues included in an implementation intention show up in unrelated 
tasks and the behavior specified in the implementation intention can be applied. 
It was argued that if the effects of implementation intentions are based on 
automaticity, behavior Y should result from the perception of cue X no matter 
whether the behavior has concurrently an impact on goal attainment or not. 
Thus, the automatic action initiation through implementation intentions should 
also occur during the pursuit of goals different from the one the implementation 
intention was formed for. In two studies support for this hypothesis was found. 
In Study 4 an intention to judge one outgroup positively overgeneralized to the 
judgments of a second outgroup when the situational cues X from the 
implementation intention directed at the first outgroup were present. This 
overgeneralization of behavior should, similar to automatic behavior (e.g., 
Schubert & Häfner, 2003), change into contrasting behavior, if a social 
comparison between the target of behavior and the self is triggered while the 
cue is perceived. As predicted, in Study 5 such contrast behavior in form of 
more negative judgments of a second outgroup was found, when the situational 
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cues X of an implementation intention to judge the ingroup positively, were 
present. 
 
The present findings contribute to the literature on automatic effects of 
implementation intentions as well as to the literature on intergroup relations. 
They show that the automatic processes of implementation intentions can bias 
attention during the pursuit of other goals as unintended side effect. In addition, 
they demonstrate that group-directed implementation intentions can bias 
behavior towards other outgroups and that these side effects are moderated by 
the structure of the social environment. The same automatic processes (i.e., 
attention attraction, automatic action initiation) that can promote successful goal 
pursuit can also hinder it depending on the goal that is actually pursued. These 
results are a further step towards a better understanding of the automatic 
processes of implementation intentions and their benefits as well as costs for 
goal pursuit.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
 
Psychologen stimmen darin überein, dass Ziele zentral für das 
menschliche Funktionieren sind (z.B. Locke & Latham, 1990). Welche Ziele 
man zu erreichen beabsichtigt definiert man in Ziel-Intentionen („Ich 
beabsichtige Ziel Z zu erreichen!“). Sie überführen unverbindliche Wünsche in 
verbindliche Ziele. Trotzdem ist die Kluft zwischen der Setzung von Zielen und 
der Erreichung von Zielen oft groß (Gollwitzer, 1999). Um die Zielerreichung zu 
verbessern können Vorsätze gebildet werden, in denen man festlegt, wann, wo 
und wie man beabsichtigt ein Ziel zu verfolgen („Wenn Situation X auftritt, 
werde ich Verhalten Y ausführen!“). Vorsätze sind demnach spezielle Pläne, 
mit denen Ziel-Intentionen ausgestattet werden können. Sie erlauben es, die 
Initiierung von zielgerichteten Verhaltensweisen an Stimuli in der Umwelt zu 
delegieren und so die Zielerreichung zu verbessern. Es ist das Ziel dieser 
Arbeit nicht nur den Nutzen von Vorsätzen, sondern insbesondere potentielle 
Kosten von Vorsätzen zu untersuchen.  
 
Bisherige Befunde zeigen, dass Vorsätze, auch wenn sie durch einen 
intentionalen Willensakt gebildet werden, automatische Effekte haben (für eine 
Übersicht, siehe Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). So führen sie zur verbesserten 
Wahrnehmung der im Vorsatz definierten Stimuli X (z.B. Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & 
Midden, 1999) und zur automatischen Initiierung des festgelegten Verhaltens Y, 
sobald die definierten Stimuli X auftreten (z.B. Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & 
Gollwitzer, 2001). Allerdings fehlt in der bisherigen Forschung die 
Untersuchung von möglichen Kosten der Automatik von Vorsätzen in Form von 
nicht-intendierten Nebeneffekten, wenn situative Stimuli X eines Vorsatzes 
während der Verfolgung eines anderen Ziels als Ziel Z anwesend sind. In zwei 
Untersuchungsfragen wurden diese nicht-intendierten Nebeneffekte adressiert. 
Während die erste Frage darauf abzielte, ob Vorsätze die Aufmerksamkeit als 
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nicht-intendierten Nebeneffekt beeinflussen, zielte die zweite Frage darauf ab, 
ob Vorsätze Verhalten als nicht-intendierten Nebeneffekt beeinflussen. 
 
Nebeneffekte von Vorsätzen in Bezug auf die Aufmerksamkeit wurden 
erwartet, wenn situative Stimuli X aus einem Vorsatz während der Bearbeitung 
anderer Aufgaben auftreten. Dabei wurde getestet, inwieweit aufgrund der 
beschränkten Aufmerksamkeitsressourcen die Anziehung von Aufmerksamkeit 
durch situative Stimuli X eines Vorsatzes zu einer verringerten Aufmerksamkeit 
auf andere relevante Stimuli führt. In drei Studien wurden Belege für diese 
Annahme gefunden. Aufmerksamkeitsanziehungseffekte wurden in Kontexten 
mit mehr als einer wichtigen Aufgabendimension (Studie 1), sowie bei der 
separaten Messung in einer unabhängigen Aufgabe (Studie 2 und 3) gezeigt. 
Zusätzlich wurde ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen 
Aufmerksamkeitseffekten und verbesserter Leistung demonstriert (Studie 3). 
Mehr Aufmerksamkeitsanziehung trat zusammen mit verbesserten Leistungen 
durch Vorsätze in einer separaten Aufgabe auf.  
 
Nebeneffekte von Vorsätzen in Bezug auf das Verhalten wurden erwartet, wenn 
situative Stimuli X aus einem Vorsatz während der Bearbeitung anderer 
Aufgaben auftreten, in denen das im Vorsatz festgelegte Verhalten anwendbar 
ist. Wenn die Effekte von Vorsätzen auf deren Automatik basieren, sollte das 
spezifizierte Verhalten Y auf die Wahrnehmung von Stimulus X folgen, 
unabhängig davon, ob das Verhalten Y der aktuellen Zielerreichung dient oder 
nicht. Das heißt, die automatische Verhaltensinitiierung durch Vorsätze sollte 
auch während der Verfolgung anderer als der im Vorsatz festgelegten Ziele 
stattfinden. In zwei Studien wurden Belege für diese Annahme gefunden. In 
Studie 4 übergeneralisierte die Intention, eine Fremdgruppe positiv zu bewerten 
auf die Bewertung einer zweiten Fremdgruppe, wenn Stimuli X aus dem 
Vorsatz für die erste Fremdgruppe anwesend waren. Dieses 
übergeneralisierende Verhalten sollte sich, ähnlich wie automatisches 
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Verhalten (z.B. Schubert & Häfner, 2003), in kontrastierendes Verhalten 
umkehren, wenn während des Erscheinens der situativen Stimuli X ein sozialer 
Vergleich zwischen dem Ziel des Verhaltens und dem Selbst angeregt wird. 
Wie vorhergesagt, wurde in Studie 5 dieses Kontrastverhalten in Form von 
negativeren Bewertungen einer zweiten Fremdgruppe gefunden, wenn Stimuli 
X aus dem Vorsatz, die Eigengruppe positiv zu bewerten, anwesend waren. 
 
Die vorliegenden Befunde tragen zur Forschung zu automatischen 
Effekten von Vorsätzen wie auch zur Forschung zu Beziehungen zwischen 
sozialen Gruppen bei. Sie demonstrieren, dass die automatischen Prozesse 
von Vorsätzen als nicht-intendierter Nebeneffekt die Aufmerksamkeit bei der 
Verfolgung anderer Ziele beeinflussen können. Zusätzlich zeigen sie, dass 
gruppen-bezogene Vorsätze Verhalten gegenüber anderen Fremdgruppen 
beeinflussen können und dass diese Nebeneffekte durch die Struktur der 
sozialen Umwelt moderiert werden. Die gleichen Prozesse (d.h. 
Aufmerksamkeitsanziehung, automatische Verhaltensinitiierung), die die 
Zielerreichung verbessern können, sie ebenso behindern je nach dem, welches 
Ziel gerade verfolgt wird. Diese Befunde sind ein weiterer Schritt zu einem 
verbesserten Verständnis von automatischen Prozessen von Vorsätzen und 
ihren Nutzen wie auch ihren Kosten für die Zielverfolgung. 
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